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Cross-Sectional Challenges: Gender, Race, and Six-
Person Juries 
Jeannine Bell* and Mona Lynch** 
After two grand juries failed to indict the police officers that killed Michael 
Brown and Eric Garner in 2014, our nation has engaged in polarizing 
discussions about how juries reach their decision.  The very legitimacy of our 
justice system has come into question.  Increasingly, deep concerns have been 
raised regarding the role of race and gender in jury decision-making in such 
controversial cases.  Tracing the roots of juror decision-making is especially 
complicated when jurors’ race and gender are factored in as considerations.  
This Article relies on social science research to explore the many cross-sectional 
challenges involved in the jurors’ decision-making in the George Zimmerman 
case.  To analyze how the Zimmerman jurors’ race and gender may have affected 
their decision-making in the case, this Article presents empirical studies 
evaluating the effect of race and gender on juror decision-making in criminal 
cases.  The aim of this Article is to create dialogue about an important challenge 
for our justice system: How can we fulfill the constitutional mandate that juries 
be diverse?  How can we overcome the barriers to fulfilling this ideal?  This 
Article’s suggestions also include focusing on the prosecutor’s special obligations 
to serve justice by selecting a jury that adequately represents the community from 
which it is drawn.  These and other changes are crucial to ensuring that 
communities accept even the most controversial jury decisions as legitimate. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On February 26, 2012, twenty-eight-year-old neighborhood watch 
coordinator George Zimmerman shot and killed Trayvon Martin in 
Sanford, Florida, a suburb of Orlando.1  Martin, a seventeen-year-old 
boy, had been returning from a snack run when he encountered 
 
 1  Lizette Alvarez, Justice Department Investigation Is Sought in Florida Teenager’s 
Shooting Death, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/ 
03/17/us/justice-department-investigation-is-sought-in-florida-teenagers-shooting-
death.html; Campbell Robertson & John Schwartz, Shooting Focuses Attention on a 
Program That Seeks to Avoid Guns, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/us/trayvon-martin-death-spotlights-
neighborhood-watch-groups.html. 
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Zimmerman.2  Martin was not armed.3  Nearly two months later, after 
much political turmoil, George Zimmerman was charged with second 
degree murder.4  In July of 2013, a jury acquitted Zimmerman of all 
charges related to Martin’s death.5 
Widespread protests greeted the jury’s verdict in this case.6  
Commentators questioned the jurors’ objectivity,7 their understanding 
of the case,8 and whether or not they were racially biased.9  The first 
juror to speak publicly about the verdict was a White woman 
interviewed by CNN just days after the verdict was announced.  Her 
interview added to the public sentiment that the verdict may have been 
biased by reinforcing racial tropes about the criminally violent threat 
posed by Martin.10  Many commentators have ignored the multiple 
factors at work in this particular case.  This Article examines the jury’s 
verdict in light of social science research on jury decision-making, 
including the work on gender and racial dynamics in the context of 
 
 2  Kara Dapena, Timeline of Events: Seven Deadly Minutes, MIAMI HERALD (May 23, 
2012), http://media.miamiherald.com/static/Trayvon%20Timeline/ 
TrayvonMapNew19.swf.  
 3  Alvarez, supra note 1. 
 4  Lizette Alvarez & Michael Cooper, Prosecutor Files Charge of 2nd-degree Murder in 
Shooting of Martin, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/ 
04/12/us/zimmerman-to-be-charged-in-trayvon-martin-shooting.html. 
 5  Manuel Roig-Franzia, Zimmerman Found Not Guilty in Killing of Trayvon Martin, 
WASH. POST (July 14, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/zimmerman-
trial-jurors-request-clarification-on-manslaughter-instructions/2013/07/ 
13/3a26dbbe-ec0c-11e2-aa9f-c03a72e2d342_story.html.  
 6  Michael Pearson et al., Verdict Doesn’t End Debate in Trayvon Martin Death, CNN 
(July 16, 2013), http://edition.cnn.com/2013/07/15/justice/zimmerman-verdict-
protests/. 
 7  Earl Ofari Hutchinson, Opinion, Zimmerman Trial Juror b37 Reconfirms Glaring 
Juror Racial Bias, HUFFINGTON POST (July 17, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
earl-ofari-hutchinson/zimmerman-trial-juror-b37_b_3611614.html. 
 8  Former federal prosecutor Tanya Miller said: “What is really clear when we hear 
this juror [identified as B-29] speak is that she really misunderstood the law.  She did 
not appropriately apply the law to the facts because she didn’t understand it.”  The 
Situation Room (CNN television broadcast July 26, 2013) (transcript available at 
http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1307/26/sitroom.01.html).  
 9  See, e.g., Richard Gabriel, Opinion, Race, Bias, and the Zimmerman Jury, CNN (July 
16, 2013), http://edition.cnn.com/2013/07/16/opinion/gabriel-bias-zimmerman/; 
William Saletan, Opinion, Jury Rigged: Did Racism Skew the Zimmerman Verdict?, SLATE 
(July 17, 2013), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/frame_game/ 
2013/07/zimmerman_jury_bias_did_racism_or_stand_your_ground_skew_the_verdi
ct.html. 
 10  Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees (CNN television broadcast July 15 & 16, 2013) 
(transcripts available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/ 
1307/15/acd.01.html and http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1307/ 
16/acd.01.html). 
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six-person juries.  We argue that the Zimmerman verdict is the product 
of several intersecting factors at play in this case and cannot be 
singularly attributed to any one of them. 
Part I of the Article details the crime itself, including the law 
enforcement response and the trial.  The second part of the Article 
discusses “stand your ground” statutes, which received significant 
attention in the wake of Martin’s killing.  In an effort to analyze how 
the Zimmerman jurors’ race and gender may have affected their 
decision-making in the case, Part III details a host of systematic 
empirical studies evaluating how race and gender affect juror decision-
making in criminal cases.  Part III also examines the empirical research 
on group decision-making dynamics, including impacts of jury size.  
Part IV analyzes the constitutional requirement that juries be diverse 
and the barriers to fulfilling this ideal.  This part also argues that 
intersectionality theory helps explain the jury’s decision-making in 
controversial cases like Zimmerman’s, as well as public and media 
reactions to the verdicts.  The Article concludes by calling for stronger 
measures to ensure a fair cross-section of communities is represented 
on juries.  This includes recognition of the distinct obligations of the 
prosecutor to serve justice by selecting a jury that adequately 
represents the community from which it is drawn.  Above and beyond 
the case-specific constitutional imperatives that are served by 
representative juries, the measures this Article calls for are crucial to 
ensuring that communities accept even the most controversial jury 
decisions as legitimate. 
I.  A CONFRONTATION ON A RAINY SUNDAY NIGHT 
A. The Accounts 
Using eyewitness accounts and cell phone records, the Miami 
Herald reconstructed the events leading up to Trayvon Martin’s 
death.11  According to that reconstructed version, at approximately 
6:24 PM, Martin, who was five feet eleven inches and 158 pounds, left 
the local 7-11 store where he went to purchase snacks.12  Martin had 
been staying with his father, Tracy Martin, and his father’s girlfriend, 
in a Sanford gated community, the Retreat at Twin Lakes, where 
George Zimmerman also lived.13  As Martin walked back to his father’s 
home, he chatted on the cellphone with a friend.14  At 7:09 PM, George 
 
 11  Dapena, supra note 2. 
 12  Id.  
 13  Id.  
 14  Id. 
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Zimmerman called 911 from his SUV to report a “suspicious teenager” 
walking near the clubhouse of the housing development.15  
Zimmerman, who was the neighborhood watch coordinator,16 was not 
on patrol when he first saw Martin, but rather was on a run to the 
store.17  At the time, Zimmerman had a Kel Tec nine-millimeter semi-
automatic handgun in his possession, which he always wore holstered 
while on neighborhood patrols.18  At 7:11 PM, Zimmerman pursued 
Martin on foot for about fifteen seconds, then was advised by the 911 
operator to stop.19  Zimmerman responded that he would stop the 
pursuit.20  After a back-and-forth conversation with the police who 
indicated they were on their way, Zimmerman asked the police to call 
him when they arrived at the development’s entrance.21  Two and a half 
minutes after Zimmerman’s call to police ended, Martin’s call with his 
friend was dropped.22  At 7:16 PM, a neighbor called 911 because she 
heard someone outside crying for help.23  Seconds later, a gunshot was 
heard prompting six more neighbors to call 911.24  At 7:17 PM, the first 
police officer arrived to find Trayvon Martin shot, just 200 feet from 
his father’s backyard.25  Paramedics pronounced Martin dead at 7:30 
PM.26  When the police arrived, George Zimmerman claimed that he 
had shot Trayvon Martin in self-defense.27  Because Florida has a “stand 
your ground” law, which alters the common law duty to retreat before 
justified use of deadly force,28 Sanford police did not arrest 
Zimmerman at the scene.29  The Seminole County prosecutor, under 
whose jurisdiction it was to prosecute the crime, conducted an inquiry 
into the incident on February 26, 2012 and declined to prosecute.30  
 
 15  Id. 
 16  Id. 
 17  Dapena, supra note 2.  
 18  Id. 
 19  Id. 
 20  Id. 
 21  Id. 
 22  Id. 
 23  Dapena, supra note 2. 
 24  Id. 
 25  Id. 
 26  Id. 
 27  Greg Botelho, What Happened the Night Trayvon Martin Died, CNN (May 23, 
2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/18/justice/florida-teen-shooting-details/. 
 28  FLA. STAT. § 776.013 (2005), amended by 2014 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 2014195 
§ 4 (West); see infra notes 56–65 and accompanying text. 
 29  Id. 
 30  Alvarez & Cooper, supra note 4. 
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After nationwide protests31 and social media outcry,32 the Justice 
Department launched an investigation.33  Florida governor Rick Scott 
appointed a special prosecutor34 in the case, and on April 11, 2012, 
Zimmerman was charged with second degree murder.35 
Florida’s second degree murder statute provides: 
The unlawful killing of a human being, when perpetrated by 
any act imminently dangerous to another and evincing a 
depraved mind regardless of human life, although without 
any premeditated design to effect the death of any particular 
individual, is murder in the second degree and constitutes a 
felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a 
term of years not exceeding life or as provided in s. 775.082, 
s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.36 
Zimmerman entered a plea of not guilty.37  The trial started in June of 
2013, just over a year later.38 
B. The Trial 
On June 10, 2013, Zimmerman’s trial began with jury selection.39  
The jury that heard the case was comprised of five White women and 
one Hispanic woman;40 five of the six were mothers.41  Defense attorney 
 
 31  Trayvon Martin Rallies Spread Across the United States—In Pictures, THE GUARDIAN 
(Mar. 27, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/world/gallery/2012/mar/27/ 
trayvon-martin-marches-across-us-pictures.  
 32  Matt Gutman & Seni Tienabeso, Interest in Trayvon Martin Shooting Spurred by 
Celebrity Tweets and Petition, ABC NEWS (Mar. 21, 2012), 
http://abcnews.go.com/US/celebrity-tweets-petitions-spur-trayvon-martin-shooting-
probe/story?id=15970224. 
 33  Justice Department, FBI to Probe Florida Teen’s Death, CNN (Mar. 19, 2012, 9:23 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/19/justice/florida-teen-shooting/. 
 34  Gov. Rick Scott Appoints Special Prosecutor for Trayvon Martin Case, TAMPA BAY TIMES 
(Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.tampabay.com/news/politics/gubernatorial/gov-rick-
scott-appoints-special-prosecutor-for-trayvon-martin-case/1221406. 
 35  Alvarez & Cooper, supra note 4.  
 36  FLA. STAT. § 782.04(2) (2010), amended by FLA. STAT. § 782.04 (2012) and FLA. 
STAT. § 782.04 (2014).  
 37  Zimmerman’s Not Guilty Plea Flew Under the Radar, CBS NEWS (Apr. 24, 2012), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/zimmermans-not-guilty-plea-flew-under-the-radar/. 
 38  Richard Luscombe, Jury Selection Begins in George Zimmerman Trial, THE GUARDIAN 
(June 10, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/10/george-
zimmerman-trayvon-martin-trial-begins. 
 39  Id. 
 40  Cara Buckley, 6 Female Jurors Are Selected for Zimmerman Trial, N.Y. TIMES (June 
20, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/21/us/6-female-jurors-are-selected-for-
zimmerman-trial.html?_r=0. 
 41  Alyssa Newcomb, George Zimmerman Juror Says ‘In Our Hearts, We Felt He Was 
Guilty,’ ABC NEWS (July 25, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/US/george-zimmerman-
juror-murder/story?id=19770659.  
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Don West’s opening statement quickly revealed the difficulty of 
selecting unbiased jurors for this controversial and well-publicized 
case.  West told the following joke: 
“Knock.  Knock,” West said. 
“Who’s there?” 
“George Zimmerman.” 
“George Zimmerman who?” 
“Ah, good.  You’re on the jury.”42 
West’s joke implied that jurors who had been selected were rather 
simple-minded or out-of-touch, and thus unaware of this highly 
publicized case.43  In striking contrast to this characterization, the 
jurors’ job as decision makers in this particular trial was especially 
challenging.44  First, the nation closely watched this trial.45  The media 
extensively covered every aspect of the trial, from the selection of 
jurors to the pronouncement of the verdict.46  Jurors must have been 
aware of the weight of their decision, as the HLN network televised 
each day of the trial.47  There was also the issue of keeping straight the 
evidence, a complication that comes with more contested or more 
 
 42  George Zimmerman Trial Opens with Curses, Knock-Knock Joke, NEWS 13 (June 24, 
2013, 6:41 PM), http://mynews13.com/content/news/cfnews13/news/ 
article.html/content/news/articles/cfn/2013/6/24/opening_statements_t.html.  
 43  See Jelani Cobb, George Zimmerman’s Trial Begins, With a Knock-Knock Joke, THE 
NEW YORKER (June 24, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/george-
zimmermans-trial-begins-with-a-knock-knock-joke. 
 44  See Patrik Jonsson, Zimmerman Trial: For Jury, Anguished Task to Resolve Death of 
Trayvon Martin, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 12, 2013), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2013/0712/Zimmerman-trial-For-jury-
anguished-task-to-resolve-death-of-Trayvon-Martin.  
 45  Erin Donaghue, “We Want Peace for Trayvon:” Miami Community Leaders Call for 
Calm Ahead of George Zimmerman Verdict, CBS NEWS (July 10, 2013), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/we-want-peace-for-trayvon-miami-community-
leaders-call-for-calm-ahead-of-george-zimmerman-verdict/. 
 46  See, e.g., Lizette Alvarez, Running, a Fight and Then a Shot, a Witness Testifies in 
Zimmerman’s Trial, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/ 
26/us/witness-portrays-zimmerman-as-neighborhoods-eyes-and-ears.html?_r=0; Erin 
Donaghue, George Zimmerman Trial: Trayvon Martin “Viciously Attacked” Former 
Neighborhood Watch Volunteer, Defense Says in Opening Statement, CBS NEWS (June 24, 
2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/george-zimmerman-trial-trayvon-martin-
viciously-attacked-former-neighborhood-watch-volunteer-defense-says-in-opening-
statement/; Dana Ford, Juror: ‘No Doubt’ That George Zimmerman Feared for His Life, CNN 
(July 16, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/15/justice/zimmerman-juror-book/.  
 47  Eric Kelsey, Gavel-to-Gavel Zimmerman Trial Coverage Hints at CNN’s New Path, 
REUTERS (July 13, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/13/us-usa-florida-
shooting-television-idUSBRE96C05D20130713. 
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complex cases.48  Over the course of the month-long trial,49 
approximately sixty witnesses testified.50  The witnesses ranged from 
Martin’s and Zimmerman’s mothers51 to medical personnel who 
treated Zimmerman,52 and to dueling audio experts who testified 
about the source of the scream heard by neighbors.53  The crime had 
no eyewitnesses.54  On July 13, 2013, after sixteen and a half hours of 
deliberation, the jury acquitted Zimmerman of all charges.55 
II. “STAND YOUR GROUND” LAWS 
Much of the intellectual controversy among legal scholars that 
followed the trial involved worries that the jury’s verdict was too heavily 
influenced by Florida’s “stand your ground” law.56  Many jurisdictions 
have enacted “stand your ground” or “make my day” laws which alter 
the common law by taking away the duty to retreat.57  Rather than 
acting as a defense, these laws provide immunity from criminal 
prosecution or tort immunity to the individual who defends him or 
herself in the proper set of circumstances.58  Under the common law, 
 
 48  See Matthew A. Reiber & Jill D. Weinberg, The Complexity of Complexity: An 
Empirical Study of Juror Competence in Civil Cases, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 929, 963 (2010) (“The 
survey results . . . show that comprehension declines as factual complexity increases.”). 
 49  See George Zimmerman Case Timeline, NEWS 13, http://mynews13.com/trayvon-
timeline.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2015). 
 50  List of Witnesses Called in the George Zimmerman Trial, NEWS 13 (July 10, 2013), 
http://mynews13.com/content/news/cfnews13/news/article.html/content/news/a
rticles/cfn/2013/6/28/george_zimmerman_wit.html. 
 51  See Greg Botelho et al., Mom vs. Mom as Martin, Zimmerman Mothers Differ on 911 
Call Screams, CNN (July 5, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/05/justice/george-
zimmerman-trial/.  
 52  List of Witnesses Called in the George Zimmerman Trial, supra note 50. 
 53  Id. 
 54  See id. 
 55  Dana Ford, A Verdict and More: Get Caught Up on the George Zimmerman Case, CNN 
(July 15, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/14/justice/zimmerman-recap/. 
 56  See, e.g., F. Patrick Hubbard, The Value of Life: Constitutional Limits on Citizens Use 
of Deadly Force, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 623 (2014); Tamara F. Lawson, A Fresh Cut in an 
Old Wound—A Critical Analysis of the Trayvon Martin Killing: The Public Outcry, the 
Prosecutors’ Discretion, and the Stand Your Ground Law, 23 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 271, 
287 (2012); Elizabeth B. Megale, Disaster Averted: Reconciling the Desire for a Safe and 
Secure State with the Grim Realities of Stand Your Ground, 37 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 255, 314 
(2013); Nirej Sekhon, The Pedagogical Prosecutor, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 2 (2014); cf. 
Elizabeth Berenguer Megale, A Call for Change: A Contextual-Configurative Analysis of 
Florida’s ‘Stand Your Ground’ Laws, U. MIAMI L. REV. (forthcoming), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2397887 (arguing that “stand 
your ground” makes little if any difference in this and other self-defense cases). 
 57  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23 (2007).  
 58  Elizabeth Bosek et al., 16 FLA. JUR 2D Criminal Law—Substantive 
Principles/Offenses § 523 (2015). 
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if one encounters a threatening assailant outside one’s home, one has 
a duty to avoid confrontation before using deadly force.  By contrast, 
when one is acting in a jurisdiction that has a “stand your ground” law, 
if confronted by a threatening assailant when walking down the street, 
there is no duty to avoid confrontation before using deadly force.59 
“Stand your ground” complicates the traditional common law 
approach.60  Traditional common law notions of self-defense are 
predicated on a variety of factors: 1) that the individual asserting the 
defense is engaged in lawful activity; 2) that the individual is not the 
aggressor in a situation; 3) that the individual holds a reasonable belief 
that he or she is in immediate danger of unlawful bodily harm from an 
adversary; and 4) that the individual uses force proportional to the 
threat posed.61  Generally, if individuals are unlawfully attacked outside 
of the home, they are required to take steps to avoid using deadly 
force.62  Traditionally, an individual may be justified in using deadly 
force in self-defense only if he or she “reasonably believes that the 
other is about to inflict unlawful death or serious bodily harm.”63 
Like the common law, “stand your ground” statutes require 
proportionality—force must be met with similar force.64  If deadly force 
is used, the individual seeking justification must have had a reasonable 
belief that deadly force was required to prevent the commission of a 
felony, death, or serious bodily harm to him or herself or another.65 
A. “Stand Your Ground” in Florida 
The Florida Legislature enacted its “stand your ground” statute, 
section 776.013, effective October 1, 2005, to offer a greater right of 
self-defense to its citizens.  At the time Zimmerman was charged, 
Florida’s statute read: 
A person who is not engaged in an unlawful activity and who 
is attacked in any other place where he or she has a right to 
be has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her 
ground and meet force with force, including deadly force if 
he or she reasonably believes it is necessary to do so to 
prevent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or 
 
 59  Id. 
 60  Lawson, supra note 56, at 287. 
 61  40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 134.  
 62  40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 159; L.W.B., Annotation, Homicide: Duty to Retreat When 
Not on One’s Own Premises, 18 A.L.R. 1279 (1922). 
 63  WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 10.4(b) at 541 (4th ed. 2003).  
 64  40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 134. 
 65  Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Construction and Application of “Make My Day” and 
“Stand Your Ground” Statutes, 76 A.L.R. 6TH 1, 9 (2012). 
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another or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony.66 
The main import of this statute for cases involving deadly force is to 
eradicate any duty to retreat if one reasonably believes that such force 
is necessary to prevent one’s own or another’s death or great bodily 
harm.67  Rather than acting in the traditional manner as a defense that 
the defendant could assert to escape liability if charged,68 Florida’s 
“stand your ground” statute goes much further.  By design, the statute 
wholly immunizes defendants from any of the negative effects of 
prosecution.69  Under the Florida statute, defendants may escape tort 
liability and prosecution in criminal cases.70 
Previous Florida cases in which defendants asserted their rights 
under the “stand your ground” law have involved circumstances far 
removed from the situation in which George Zimmerman 
encountered Trayvon Martin.  In State v. Gallo for instance, the 
defendant, Alphonse Orlando Gallo, and the victim, Patrick Barbour, 
knew each other.71  They argued outside a nightclub over a debt that 
Barbour allegedly owed Gallo.72  Things got heated between the two 
men and an armed confrontation ensued, involving not just Gallo and 
Barbour, but two other men.73  Barbour was killed, and prosecutors 
charged Gallo with second degree murder.74  When Gallo argued 
immunity, both trial and appeals courts agreed that he had immunity 
from prosecution under Florida’s “stand your ground” law.75 
The relationship between weapons and criminality has meant that 
legislatures enacting “stand your ground” statutes are often blindingly 
clear about the fact that they do not wish those engaged in illegal 
activity to find protection in “stand your ground” laws.76  Thus, courts 
have rejected the defense in situations where individuals engaged in 
 
 66  FLA. STAT.  § 776.013(3) (2005) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 776.012(2) 
(West 2014).  
 67  See State v. Smiley, 927 So. 2d 1000, 1001 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). 
 68  Id. 
 69  See FLA. STAT. § 776.013 (2005), amended by 2014 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 2014-
195 § 4. 
 70  See Smiley, 927 So. 2d at 1002. 
 71  76 So. 3d 407 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).  
 72  Id. at 408. 
 73  Id. 
 74  Id.  
 75  Id. at 409. 
 76  For example, both LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:20(C) (2014) and OKLA. STAT. tit. 
21, § 1289.25(D) (2011) use essentially the same language as Florida’s 2005 statute, 
explicitly declaring no duty to retreat if a person “is not engaged in an unlawful 
activity.”  See FLA. STAT. § 776.013 (2005), amended by 2014 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 2014-
195 § 4 (West).  
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illegal behavior have sought immunity from prosecution.  One 
example from Florida, Darling v. State, involved a convicted felon who 
went to a housing project to purchase marijuana.77  Though he was by 
law prohibited from carrying a weapon,78 a previous experience 
purchasing drugs at the same location persuaded the defendant to arm 
himself.79  Though the defendant was not able to purchase drugs at this 
particular time, someone on the street accosted him and a gunfight 
ensued.80  Ultimately, the gunfight resulted in a bystander’s death.81  
The defendant attempted to avoid criminal liability by relying on the 
“stand your ground” statute to argue that he was responding to 
another’s threat.82  The trial court, using reasoning later upheld on 
appeal, found that because the defendant was a felon in possession of 
a firearm, he could not rely on the “stand your ground” statute.83 
B. How “Stand Your Ground” Laws Work on the Ground with 
Defendants as a Function of Race 
Anecdotal and systematic evidence suggests that prosecutors have 
applied “stand your ground” laws differentially depending upon the 
defendant’s race.  Anecdotally, one can point to Marissa Alexander, a 
thirty-two-year-old Black Floridian who was unable to rely on “stand 
your ground” at trial in 2010.84  Prosecuted by Angela Corey, the same 
special prosecutor assigned to the Zimmerman case,85 Alexander was 
charged with aggravated assault after she discharged a warning shot 
into the wall during an altercation with her abusive husband.86  No one 
was injured during the altercation.87  The judge in Alexander’s case 
rejected her use of Florida’s “stand your ground” statute, and after 
convicting Alexander on three counts of aggravated assault, sentenced 
her to twenty years in prison.88 
 
 77  Darling v. State, 81 So. 3d 574 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).  
 78  Id. at 578.  
 79  Id. at 576.  
 80  Id.  
 81  Id.  
 82  Id.  
 83  Darling, 81 So. 3d at 578–79.  
 84  Billy Kenber, Marissa Alexander Case in Spotlight After Zimmerman Trial, WASH. 
POST (July 15, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2013/07/15/ 
6030be5a-ed5c-11e2-9008-61e94a7ea20d_story.html.  
 85  Id.  
 86  Id.  
 87  Id.  
 88   Id. The Zimmerman trial created significant buzz about Alexander’s case, 
especially since the special prosecutor assigned to the Zimmerman case also 
prosecuted Alexander’s case.  Following a successful appeal to Florida’s First District 
BELL & LYNCH (DO NOT DELETE) 1/28/2016  12:29 PM 
430 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:361 
Even more compelling than anecdotal cases like that of Alexander 
is systematic evidence, which compares how Blacks and Whites fare 
when attempting to rely on “stand your ground” statutes.  One study, 
conducted by John Roman and P. Mitchell Downey of the Urban 
Institute, examined this issue using 2005–2009 data from the FBI’s 
supplementary homicide report, which includes all reported 
homicides in the United States.89  The only homicides applicable in 
“stand your ground” cases are justifiable homicides,90 which constitute 
fewer than 2% of the overall number of homicides during this time 
period.91  After separating out the justifiable homicides, the authors 
tried to find situations in which the facts resembled those in the 
Zimmerman/Martin case—a single shooter and single victim who were 
both civilians and strangers, and the victim was killed by a handgun.92 
“Stand your ground” laws have two significant impacts, according 
to Roman and Downey’s study.93  The first involves whether or not a 
jury or judge will find a homicide justified.94  The authors’ research 
revealed that in states with “stand your ground” laws, judges or juries 
found 13.6% of the homicides to be justified.  In states without “stand 
your ground” legislation judges or juries found only 7.2% to be 
justified.95 
The second impact of these types of laws, as revealed by Roman 
and Downey’s study, pertained to the relationship between conviction 
and the race of both the perpetrator and the victim.96  The authors 
examined the kinds of cases most likely to be justified and found that 
“the scenario with the highest probability of being justified is much 
like the Martin case—a single, white civilian handgun shooter who is a 
stranger to (and older than) the Black victim.”97  According to this 
 
Court of Appeal, Alexander’s conviction was overturned and her case remanded.  See 
Alexander v. State, 121 So. 3d 1185 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).  In November 2014, 
Alexander accepted a plea bargain.  Larry Hannan, Alexander takes deal in criminal case; 
out of jail Jan. 27, FLA. TIMES-UNION (Nov. 24, 2014, 6:30 PM), 
http://jacksonville.com/news/crime/2014-11-24/story/alexander-takes-deal-
criminal-case-out-jail-jan-27. 
 89  John Roman & P. Mitchell Downey, Stand Your Ground Laws and Miscarriages of 
Justice, URBAN WIRE (Mar. 29, 2012), http://blog.metrotrends.org/2012/03/stand-
ground-laws-miscarriages-justice.  
 90  Id.  
 91  Id.  
 92  Id.  
 93  Id.  
 94  Id.  
 95  Roman & Downey, supra note 89.  
 96  Id.  
 97  Id.  
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research, “stand your ground” laws exacerbate the already-existing 
racial disparities in justifiable homicide cases: 
Overall, the rate of justifiable homicides is almost six times 
higher in case [sic] with attributes that match the Martin 
case.  Racial disparities are [also] much larger, as [W]hite-
on-[B]lack homicides have justifiable findings 33 percentage 
points more often than [B]lack-on-[W]hite homicides.  
“Stand Your Ground” [(SYG)] laws appear to exacerbate 
those differences, as cases overall are significantly more likely 
to be ruled justified in SYG states than in non-SYG states . . . .98 
While it is much more likely that judges or juries will find that single 
White shooters of Blacks have justifiably killed his or her victims, this 
did not mean, of course, that the Zimmerman verdict was a foregone 
conclusion.  Out of 70,000 cases, only twenty-three homicides had 
similar facts to the Martin case, and of those, only nine (39%) were 
ruled justifiable homicides.99 
Roman and Downey argue that their research suggests that 
because Florida is a “stand your ground” state, Zimmerman would be 
exempted from the need to demonstrate to the jury that the shooting 
was justified.100  While ultimately that did not occur due to the immense 
public and political outcry,101 the defense spent a significant amount of 
time offering evidence of justification predicated on the logic of “stand 
your ground.”102  Moreover, “stand your ground” laws encourage the 
wide-scale arming of individuals.103  It is unlikely that Zimmerman, who 
told 911 dispatchers that Martin had something in his hands (candy 
and tea),104 would have exited his car and pursued Martin had he not 
 
 98  JOHN K. ROMAN, RACE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE, AND STAND YOUR GROUND LAWS: 
ANALYSIS OF FBI SUPPLEMENTARY HOMICIDE REPORT DATA 9 (2013), 
http://www.urban.org/uploadedPDF/412873-stand-your-ground.pdf.  As the author 
details, in “stand your ground” states, Black defendants are less successful than White 
defendants in obtaining a justifiable homicide determination as compared to Black 
defendants relative to White defendants in non-“stand your ground” states.  
 99  Roman & Downey, supra note 89.   
 100  Id.  
 101  See Zimmerman to Argue Self-defense, Will Not Seek ‘Stand Your Ground’ Hearing, CNN 
(May 1, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/30/justice/florida-zimmerman-
defense/.  
 102  See Lizette Alvarez, In Zimmerman Case, Self-defense Was Hard to Topple, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/15/us/in-zimmerman-case-self-
defense-was-hard-to-topple.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  
 103  See STEVEN JANSEN & M. ELAINE NUGENT-BORAKOVE, EXPANSIONS TO THE CASTLE 
DOCTRINE 12 (2007), http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/Castle%20Doctrine.pdf (noting that 
a possible negative consequence of expanding the castle doctrine is “[e]scalations in 
violence that may not have otherwise occurred if people were not carrying weapons 
for self-defense”).  
 104  Botelho, supra note 27. 
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been armed.105  These laws, then, not only exacerbate racial 
disproportionalities in outcomes of justifiable homicides,106 but also 
increase lethal violence against Blacks overall.107  Thus, one study found 
that “[c]ontrolling for population, the number of homicides of Black 
people that were deemed justifiable in Stand Your Ground states more 
than doubled between 2005 and 2011—rising from 0.5 to 1.2 per 
100,000 people—while it remained unchanged in the rest of the 
country.”108 
III. GRAPPLING WITH THE EVIDENCE: ISSUES OF RACE AND 
GENDER 
Against the backdrop of Florida’s “stand your ground law,” the 
Zimmerman jury also grappled with ambiguous and complicated 
evidentiary issues.  No one saw the entire encounter between Martin 
and Zimmerman at close range.109  The defense argued that George 
Zimmerman had shot Trayvon Martin because he feared for his life.110  
Key to that assertion was a 911 recording of a voice screaming for 
help.111  The defense put on nine witnesses who maintained that the 
voice on the recording was Zimmerman’s,112 whereas the prosecution 
put on witnesses who identified the voice as Martin’s.113  From the 
prosecution’s perspective, a clear size and force differential existed 
between the victim and defendant; the armed Zimmerman 
outweighed Martin by more than forty pounds.114  There is also the 
innocence factor that the prosecution sought to make salient for the 
 
 105  Author Jeannine Bell is grateful to Tracey Meares for this point. 
 106  NAT’L URBAN LEAGUE ET AL., SHOOT FIRST: ‘STAND YOUR GROUND’ LAWS AND 
THEIR EFFECT ON VIOLENT CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 7 (2013), 
http://maig.us/186JLnh.  
 107  Id. at 4. 
 108  Id. at 7.  
 109  Yamiche Alcindor, Witnesses in Trayvon Martin Case Offer Differing Accounts, USA 
TODAY (June 3, 2012), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-06-
03/trayvon-martin-case-witness-statements/55349480/1.  
 110  See Zimmerman to Argue Self-defense, Will Not Seek ‘Stand your Ground’ Hearing, supra 
note 101.  
 111   Lizette Alvarez, Trayvon Martin’s Father Says Screams on 911 Tape Were His Son’s, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/09/us/friends-testify-
that-zimmerman-is-the-one-screaming-for-help-on-911-call.html?_r=0.  
 112  Id.  
 113  Id.  
 114  See A Review of the Evidence Released in the Trayvon Martin Case, TAMPA BAY TIMES 
(May 17, 2012), http://www.tampabay.com/news/a-review-of-the-evidence-released-
in-the-trayvon-martin-case/1230750; Documents in the Trayvon Martin Case, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/05/17/us/trayvon-
martin-documents.html.  
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jurors: Martin, a teenager, was on a snack run and had no history of 
violence.115 
Conversely, the defense constructed a narrative of Martin as a 
prototypical criminal threat,116 tying Zimmerman’s reaction to him to 
a series of burglaries that occurred in the housing development over 
the prior year.117  Why did the jurors ultimately accept Zimmerman’s 
story (or reject the prosecution’s version)?  What might have been 
expected given research on how juror demographics, defendant and 
victim demographics, and jury dynamics interact in criminal cases? 
A. The Development of Empirical Jury Research 
Systematic empirical research on jury decision-making dates back 
to the 1950s with the launching of the University of Chicago Jury 
Project.118  The Chicago Jury Project brought together lawyers and 
social scientists to broadly study the jury as an American legal 
institution.119  One focus within this pioneering endeavor was on jury 
dynamics in criminal trials, with early insights drawn from field 
research conducted with jurors sitting on criminal cases in both 
Chicago, Illinois and Brooklyn, New York.120  The Project culminated 
in a nation-wide survey of 555 judges regarding their experiences 
presiding over criminal trials, which was published by lead researchers 
Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel in The American Jury.121  This book 
reported on how and why juries and judges diverged in case 
assessments and verdict preferences, which occurred in about a 
quarter of the 3576 cases described by the surveyed judges in the 
questionnaires.122 
Kalven and Zeisel’s insights set the ball rolling on several strands 
of research that continue to this day123 and that have implications for 
 
 115  Trayvon Martin, BIOGRAPHY.COM., http://www.biography.com/people/trayvon-
martin-21283721 (last visited Feb. 18, 2015).  
 116  George Zimmerman Lawyers Release Data from Trayvon Martin’s Cellphone, THE 
GUARDIAN (May 23, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/23/ 
zimmerman-lawyers-trayvon-martin-texts.  
 117  Erin Donaghue, George Zimmerman Trial: Chris Serino, Lead Detective in Case of 
Trayvon Martin Killing, Takes Stand Again Tuesday, CBS NEWS (July 10 2013), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/george-zimmerman-trial-chris-serino-lead-detective-
in-case-of-trayvon-martin-killing-takes-stand-again-tuesday/. 
 118  Dale W. Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744 (1959).  
 119  Id.  
 120  Id. at 747.  
 121  HARRY KALVEN & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).  
 122  Id. at 55–56.  
 123  See, e.g., DANIEL GIVELBER & AMY FARRELL, NOT GUILTY: ARE THE ACQUITTED 
INNOCENT? (2012); Valerie P. Hans et al., The Hung Jury: The American Jury’s Insights and 
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understanding the verdict in the Zimmerman case.  For instance, one 
significant finding was that when juries disagreed with judges, the jury 
was typically more lenient on criminal defendants.124  In about 85% of 
the disagreements, the jury voted to acquit where the judge deemed 
the appropriate verdict to be a conviction.125  Kalven and Zeisel argued 
that the tendency toward leniency, relative to the trial judges’ 
assessments, was not due to jurors’ comprehension problems, but 
rather seemed to occur in close cases in which the juries were thought 
to be “liberated” from the strength of the evidence, allowing them to 
make judgments in light of other factors, including “sentimentality.”126  
Thus, the “liberation hypothesis” was born, prompting a line of 
research regarding conditions under which “extra-legal” factors, such 
as racial or other stereotypes,127 in-group favoritism,128 empathy,129 or 
other such phenomena exert influence on jury outcomes.130 
Finally, the findings from the field study portion of the Project 
found that jurors’ verdict preference, pre-deliberation, was the best 
predictor of verdict outcome.131  This suggested that perhaps the group 
deliberation process was less important in most cases than thought to 
be.  In light of this hypothesis, a number of scholars subsequently set 
out to uncover how juries come to decisions: Is it as simple as a 
“majority rules” vote that causes minority members to join the crowd, 
or are there other dynamics at play?132  Moreover, do jurors make 
 
Contemporary Understanding, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 33 (2003).  See also Theodore Eisenberg 
et al., Judge-Jury Agreement in Criminal Cases: A Partial Replication of Kalven and Zeisel’s The 
American Jury, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 171 (2005) (recent partial replication of this 
classic study).  
 124  KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 58–59.  
 125  Id. at 61 (converting ratio of 8:1).  
 126  Id. at 164–66.  
 127  DAVID C. BALDUS, GEORGE WOODWORTH & CHARLES A. PULASKI, JR., EQUAL 
JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 399 (1990); Jonathan R. 
Sorensen & Donald H. Wallace, Capital Punishment in Missouri: Examining the Issue of 
Racial Disparity, 13 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 61 (1995); Marian R. Williams & Melissa W. Burek, 
Justice, Juries, and Convictions: The Relevance of Race in Jury Verdicts, 31 J. CRIME & JUST. 
149 (2008).  
 128  Norbert L. Kerr et al., Defendant-Juror Similarity and Mock Juror Judgments, 19 LAW 
& HUM. BEHAV. 545 (1995).  
 129  See generally Bette L. Bottoms et al., Explaining Gender Differences in Jurors’ Reactions 
to Child Sexual Assault Cases, 32 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 789 (2014).  
 130  BALDUS ET AL., supra note 127, at 40304.  For a direct test of the liberation 
hypothesis using pretrial publicity influence as the dependent variable, see Dennis J. 
Devine et al., Strength of Evidence, Extra Evidentiary Influence, and the Liberation Hypothesis: 
Data from the Field., 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 136 (2009). 
 131  Broeder, supra note 118, at 747.  
 132  See REID HASTIE, STEVEN D. PENROD & NANCY PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY 22–
23 (1983) for information on the “story model” of deliberations.   
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decisions about their verdict preferences prematurely, before the 
conclusion of evidence and arguments?133 
Jury research along these lines began to flourish within several 
years of The American Jury’s publication,134 and psychologists, in 
particular, have produced a substantial proportion of this work.135  
Numerous tangents of this body of research and multiple ways to map 
it exist.  For the purposes of this Article, this research will be broken 
down in its sequential order to describe relevant research that speaks 
to influences, at both the individual and group levels, on the jury’s 
decision, beginning with the potential venire person through to the 
final verdict in a criminal matter.  As the diagram below models, there 
are multiple stages and levels in the jury process which can influence 
verdict outcomes above and beyond the testimony, evidence, and 
arguments in a given case.  Put simply, how a case is understood and 
assessed will vary as a function of the individuals tasked with fact-
finding and the unique group dynamics of the jury unit.  Therefore, 
how individuals are identified for selection, who is seated and who is 
excluded, and how that assemblage of individuals relates and 
undertakes the fact-finding task will matter, to varying degrees, for the 
outcome determination. 
 
 
 
 
 
 133  Robert MacCoun, Experimental Research on Jury Decision-making, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 
223 (1990).  
 134  Valerie P. Hans & Neil Vidmar, The American Jury at Twenty-five Years, 16 LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 323 (1991).  
 135  See DENNIS J. DEVINE, JURY DECISION MAKING: STATE OF THE SCIENCE (2012) 
[hereinafter DEVINE, JURY DECISION MAKING]; Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision 
Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 
622 (2001) [hereinafter Devine et al., 45 Years].  For a collection of recent work by 
psychologists, see 1 JURY PSYCHOLOGY: SOCIAL ASPECTS OF TRIAL PROCESSES (Joel D. 
Lieberman & Daniel A. Krauss eds., 2009).  
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Figure 1: Stages and Levels of Influence of Jury Decision-making: 
This Article views this as a path-dependent, cumulative effects 
model, in which the earlier-stage outcomes shape later-stage processes.  
In other words, each stage involves processes that themselves may be 
subject to bias, extra-legal influence, and error, and those biases and 
errors move on in consequential ways through the subsequent steps.136  
This Article will primarily focus on individual-level juror attributes and 
how they interact with defendant and victim characteristics.  It will then 
move on to examine group-level processes that lead to a jury verdict, 
with a focus on how jury composition shapes outcomes, including 
members’ demographic make-up, case characteristics and decision-
making criteria, and jury size. 
B. Demographic, Experiential, and Attitudinal Variability of Jurors 
1. Juror Characteristics and Judgment 
Despite the mythological legal ideal of the juror as a “blank 
slate,”137 potential jurors arrive at courthouses with a diverse array of 
life experiences, which emerge in part from their social and 
demographic backgrounds.  These life experiences influence jurors’ 
perceptions, knowledge bases, attitudes, and beliefs.  Individual 
characteristics can, in turn, condition how jurors understand and 
judge case information.138  Some psychological research has 
demonstrated that individual juror characteristics can matter in juror 
decision-making for cases involving criminal charges, and the degree 
of influence typically varies as a function of case facts.139  Personality 
 
 136  For a full discussion of such a model in the capital case context, see Mona Lynch 
and Craig Haney, Mapping the Racial Bias of the White Male Capital Juror: Jury Composition 
and the “Empathic Divide,” 45 LAW AND SOC’Y REV. 69 (2011). 
 137  See SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL: 
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 6 (1988).  
 138  DEVINE, JURY DECISION MAKING, supra note 135.  
 139  See generally id. at 103–16.   
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traits like dogmatism140 and authoritarianism,141 for instance, have been 
shown to predict conviction-proneness.142  Attitudes about 
punishment, especially capital punishment, can also influence 
judgment processes and verdict preferences.143  Because death penalty 
attitudes are central to the capital jury qualification process,144 they 
have been most extensively studied.145  Generally, research indicates 
that support for capital punishment predicts both conviction-
proneness146 and premature judgments of guilt.147 
2. Juror-Defendant Interactions 
Juror characteristics can also interact with defendant 
characteristics.  For instance, a number of studies have demonstrated 
a “similarity-leniency effect,”148 whereby jurors who share demographic 
features with the defendant, including gender, socio-economic status, 
and especially racial or ethnic identity, are acquittal-prone in weak-
evidence cases.  Conversely, studies have also shown a “Black sheep 
effect,” whereby similar jurors are guilt-prone in strong-evidence 
cases.149 
 
 
 
 140  Heather M. Kleider, Leslie R. Knuycky & Sarah E. Cavrak, Deciding the Fate of 
Others: The Cognitive Underpinnings of Racially Biased Juror Decision Making, 139 J. GEN. 
PSYCHOL. 175 (2012) (discussing the issues of cognitive capacity of jurors, evidence 
type, and racial bias in outcomes).  
 141  Douglass J. Narby, Brian L. Cutler & Gary Moran, A Meta-Analysis of the 
Association Between Authoritarianism and Jurors’ Perceptions of Defendant Culpability, 78 J. 
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 34 (1993).  
 142  Carol M. Werner, Dorothy K. Kagehiro, & Michael J. Strube, Conviction Proneness 
and the Authoritarian Juror: Inability to Disregard Information or Attitudinal Bias?, 67 J. 
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 629, 629 (1982).  
 143  For a review, see Mona Lynch, The Social Psychology of Capital Cases, in JURY 
PSYCHOLOGY: SOCIAL ASPECTS OF TRIAL PROCESSES 157 (Joel D. Lieberman & Daniel A. 
Krauss eds., 2012).  
 144  Id.  
 145  Id.  For an example of such work, see Craig Haney, Aida Hurtado & Luis Vega, 
“Modern” Death Qualification: New Data on Its Biasing Effects, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 619 
(1994).  
 146  William C. Thompson et al., Death Penalty Attitudes and Conviction Proneness: The 
Translation of Attitudes into Verdicts, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 95, 104 (1984) (explaining 
that death penalty attitudes predict conviction proneness through differential 
interpretation of evidence).   
 147  W. J. Bowers, M. Sandys & B. Steiner, Foreclosed Impartiality in Capital Sentencing: 
Jurors’ Predispositions, Guilt-Trial Experience, and Premature Decision Making, 83 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1476, 1531 (1998).  
 148  DEVINE, JURY DECISION MAKING, supra note 135, at 113. 
 149  Id.  
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The other side of this coin, of course, is out-group bias, whereby 
defendants with dissimilar demographics from jurors will be generally 
disadvantaged.150  Experimental mock jury research on capital penalty-
phase decision-making has demonstrated that White men may be 
particularly prone to exercising out-group bias, in that they are 
significantly more likely to sentence a Black male defendant to death 
than they are to sentence an otherwise identical White male 
defendant.151  Notably, in this study, racially disparate sentencing was 
isolated to the White male participants as a subgroup, suggesting that 
in-group/out-group biases may be particularly problematic for this 
group.152  More generally, a meta-analysis of thirty-four mock jury 
studies involving nearly 7400 participants indicates that “participants 
were more likely to render guilt judgments for other-race defendants 
than for defendants of their own race.”153  Taken together, these 
findings appear to suggest that racial identification with the defendant 
can be an important moderator of verdicts, particularly in equivocal 
cases. 
Because the vast majority of criminal defendants are men,154 there 
would seem to be the potential for a gender-based out-group bias 
among women jurors for most criminal cases.  Moreover, while 
“literally hundreds of jury studies have measured participant 
gender[,] . . . [f]ormal hypotheses or even explicit expectations 
regarding participant gender are actually rather rare.”155  Of the body 
of research that has focused on gender differences and lay judgment 
in criminal cases, most studies have used various sexual assault 
 
 150  E.g., R. Michael Bagby & Neil A. Rector, Prejudice in a Simulated Legal Context: A 
Further Application of Social Identity Theory, 22 EUROPEAN J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 397, 397–406 
(1992).  But see Jan-Willem van Prooijen & Jerôme Lam, Retributive Justice and Social 
Categorizations: The Perceived Fairness of Punishment Depends on Intergroup Status, 37 
EUROPEAN J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 1244, 1244–55 (2007), where in-group/out-group 
relational status mediates this effect.  
 151  Lynch & Haney, supra note 136, at 87 (finding that White male mock jurors 
sentenced the White male defendant at rates similar to women and non-Whites (60% 
versus 62%), but were significantly more punitive toward the Black defendant than 
their peers (84% versus 64% death sentences)).  
 152  Id. at 86.  
 153  Tara L. Mitchell et al., Racial Bias in Mock Juror Decision-Making: A Meta-Analytic 
Review of Defendant Treatment, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 621, 627 (2005).  
 154  The Bureau of Justice Statistics survey of the nation’s seventy-five largest 
counties in 2009 (the most recent survey available) indicates that 83% of felony 
defendants that year were men and 17% were women.  BRIAN A. REAVES, FELONY 
DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2009—STATISTICAL TABLES 5, 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc09.pdf.  
 155  DEVINE, JURY DECISION MAKING, supra note 135, at 111.  
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scenarios to test hypotheses.156  Much of that research suggests that 
women are more conviction-prone157 than men, which may stem from 
either out-group bias against the defendant or in-group empathy for 
the victim.158 
For instance, an experimental study that varied the gender of 
both victim and defendant in a child sexual abuse case found that 
“women jurors were generally more pro-victim in their case judgments 
than were men jurors.”159  Nonetheless, the gender of victim did not 
mediate women’s assessment of the case, but it did so for men, in that 
they rated male victims as more responsible for the crime than female 
victims.160  Moreover, female mock jurors were no more sympathetic to 
the female defendant than were male jurors (both groups, but 
especially the male jurors, were more lenient toward the female 
defendant),161 suggesting that perhaps females are less prone to in-
group biases than males.162 
 
 156  For child sexual assault studies, see Bette L. Bottoms et al., A Review of Factors 
Affecting Jurors’ Decisions in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWITNESS 
MEMORY 1 (2007) [hereinafter Bottoms, Review]; Bette L. Bottoms, Suzanne L. Davis 
& Michelle A. Epstein, Effects of Victim and Defendant Race on Jurors’ Decisions in Child 
Sexual Abuse Cases, 34 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1 (2004); Bette L. Bottoms & Gail S. 
Goodman, Perceptions of Children’s Credibility in Sexual Assault Cases, 24 J. APPLIED SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 702 (1994).  For a review of studies on rape, see Amy Grubb & Julie Harrower, 
Attribution of Blame in Cases of Rape: An Analysis of Participant Gender, Type of Rape and 
Perceived Similarity to the Victim, 13 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 396 (2008). 
 157   In the case of rape, see, for example, Nancy Brekke & Eugene Borgida, Expert 
Psychological Testimony in Rape Trials: A Social Cognitive Analysis, 55 J. PERSONALITY 
PSYCHOL. 372, 372, 384 (1988); Kathleen McNamara, Frank Vattano & Wayne Viney, 
Verdict, Sentencing, and Certainty as a Function of Sex of Juror and Amount of Evidence in a 
Simulated Rape Trial, 72 PSYCHOL. REP. 575 (1993).  In the case of child sexual abuse, 
see Natalie J. Gabora, Nicholas P. Spanos & Amanda Joab, The Effects of Complainant 
Age and Expert Psychological Testimony in a Simulated Child Sexual Abuse Trial, 17 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 103 (1993); Jodi A. Quas et al., Effects of Victim, Defendant, and Juror Gender 
on Decisions in Child Sexual Assault Cases, 32 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1993 (2002).  
Schutte and Hosch conducted a meta-analysis of experimental studies deploying both 
child sexual abuse and rape case scenarios and found that women were more 
conviction-prone than men across all the included studies.  James W. Schutte & 
Harmon M. Hosch, Gender Differences in Sexual Assault Verdicts: A Meta-Analysis, 12 J. SOC. 
BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 759 (1997).  Women have also been found more likely to 
support detention when asked to evaluate “sexually violent predators” involving an 
adult victim.  See Laura S. Guy & John F. Edens, Juror Decision-making in a Mock Sexually 
Violent Predator Trial: Gender Differences in the Impact of Divergent Types of Expert Testimony, 
21 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 215 (2003). 
 158  Sheila R. Deitz et al., Measurement of Empathy Toward Rape Victims and Rapists, 43 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 37 (1982) (reporting higher rates of empathy for rape 
victims among women in comparison to men).  
 159  Quas et al., supra note 157, at 2009. 
 160  Id. at 2005. 
 161  Id. 
 162  Devine’s review of the literature on juror gender concurs with this.  See DEVINE, 
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Outside of the sexual assault/abuse context, which potentially 
triggers greater gender differences in judgment due to the nature of 
the cases, only a small handful of studies systematically examine the 
effect of juror gender on judgment.163  Consistent with the sex-related 
case paradigms, experimental research finds that women are also more 
conviction-prone than men in elder abuse cases, for male and female 
defendants, and for male and female victims.164  Also, several death 
penalty mock jury studies report on juror gender in sentence verdict 
preferences.  These studies find that men are more likely than women 
to “qualify” as capital jurors,165 and men are more likely to favor a death 
sentence than women when making a penalty judgment even among 
those death qualified.166 
A body of research also suggests that laypersons’ stereotypes about 
crime interact with a defendant’s race in a biasing manner.  For 
instance, in mock jury studies, minority defendants charged with 
stereotypical “street crimes” were treated more harshly than White 
defendants, whereas White defendants were treated more harshly 
when accused of “white collar” crimes.167  Stereotyped judgments 
appear to derive from both racial and class cues about the defendant.  
In another example, White mock jurors demonstrate bias against a 
Latino defendant charged with auto theft, relative to an otherwise 
identical White defendant, when the defendant is also characterized as 
being of a low socio-economic status, but not when he is portrayed as 
being of a higher socio-economic status.168  Moreover, the Latino 
defendant of a low socio-economic status was treated more harshly in 
 
JURY DECISION MAKING, supra note 135, at 112.  
 163  Id.  
 164  Jonathan M. Golding et al., The Effect of Gender in the Perception of Elder Physical 
Abuse in Court, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 605 (2005).  
 165  Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Capital Jury Deliberation: Effects on Death Sentencing, 
Comprehension, and Discrimination, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 481 (2009) [hereinafter 
Lynch & Haney, Capital Jury]; Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Discrimination and 
Instructional Comprehension: Guided Discretion, Racial Bias, and the Death Penalty, 24 LAW 
& HUM. BEHAV. 337 (2000) [hereinafter Lynch & Haney, Discrimination]; Monica K. 
Miller & R. David Hayward, Religious Characteristics and the Death Penalty, 32 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 113 (2008). 
 166  Lynch & Haney, Capital Jury, supra note 165, at 486; Lynch & Haney, 
Discrimination, supra note 165, at 346. 
 167  Randall A. Gordon, et al., Perceptions of Blue-Collar and White-Collar Crime: The 
Effect of Defendant Race on Simulated Juror Decisions, 128 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 191 (1988); see 
also Christopher S. Jones & Martin F. Kaplan, The Effects of Racially Stereotypical Crimes 
on Juror Decision-making and Information-processing Strategies, 25 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 1 (2003). 
 168  C. Willis Esqueda, R.K.E. Espinoza & S. Culhane, The Effects of Ethnicity, SES, and 
Crime Status on Juror Decision Making: A Cross-Cultural Examination of European American 
and Mexican American Mock Jurors, 30 HISPANIC J. BEHAV. SCI. 181 (2008).  
BELL & LYNCH (DO NOT DELETE) 1/28/2016  12:29 PM 
2016] CROSS-SECTIONAL CHALLENGES 441 
this study than all others, even for the “white collar” crime of 
embezzlement.169  On the other hand, no in-group favoritism for the 
Latino defendant was demonstrated: Latino jurors treated White and 
Latino defendants similarly no matter the crime or the perceived socio-
economic status of the defendant.170  Contributing to the overall bias 
against non-White defendants is the widely-held presumption that, 
absent any countering information, laypersons “see” minority 
defendants as lower class and view White defendants as belonging to a 
higher socio-economic status.171 
Psychological research has also pinpointed several conditions in 
which out-group bias of this sort is either muted or even reversed.  For 
example, Samuel Sommers and his colleagues have found that when 
race is made salient by making it relevant to the fact pattern in a mock 
criminal case, the bias of White jurors against Black defendants is 
attenuated, whereas without such “notice” of race’s relevancy, Whites 
demonstrate negative racial bias.172  Moreover, several mock juror 
studies examining White participants’ judgments of “hate crime” cases 
have found that they produce higher rates of guilt and more punitive 
recommendations for sentencing against White defendants than Black 
defendants.173  In this case, race is not only salient, but racial animus is 
a central element to the crime, which undoubtedly contributes to the 
guilt ratings as well as the sentence recommendations. 
 
 169  Id.  
 170  Id.  
 171  Jeffrey E. Pfeifer & Daniel J. Bernstein, Expressions of Modern Racism in Judgments 
of Others: The Role of Task and Target Specificity on Attributions of Guilt, 31 SOC. BEHAV. & 
PERSONALITY 749, 755 (2003) (finding “subjects were significantly more likely to 
perceive the defendant as black when he was portrayed as a low, as opposed to high, 
social status individual and more likely to perceive him as white when the defendant 
was portrayed as a high social status individual”). 
 172  Ellen S. Cohn, Donald Bucolo, Misha Pride & Samuel R. Sommers, Reducing 
White Juror Bias: The Role of Race Salience and Racial Attitudes, 39 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 
1953, 196465 (2009); Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Race in the 
Courtroom: Perceptions of Guilt and Dispositional Attributions, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 1367, 1376 (2000); Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, White 
Juror Bias: An Investigation of Prejudice Against Black Defendants in the American Courtroom, 
7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 201, 220 (2001) [hereinafter Sommers & Ellsworth, White 
Juror Bias]; see generally Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, “Race Salience” in 
Juror Decision-making: Misconceptions, Clarifications, and Unanswered Questions, 27 BEHAV. 
SCI. & L. 599 (2009) [hereinafter Sommers & Ellsworth, Race Salience] (generally 
summarizing research on the race salience effect). 
 173  Phyllis B. Gerstenfeld, Juror Decision Making in Hate Crime Cases, 14 CRIM. JUST. 
POL’Y REV. 193 (2003); Amy Marcus-Newhall, Laura Palucki Blake & Julia Baumann, 
Perceptions of Hate Crime Perpetrators and Victims as Influenced by Race, Political Orientation, 
and Peer Group, 46 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 108 (2002).  
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3. Juror-Victim Interactions 
With regard to victim characteristics and jury decision-making, 
the most robust research comes from the death-sentencing arena, 
wherein a relatively strong and consistent devaluation of minority 
victims has been observed in the United States context.174  Studies that 
use regression analytic techniques to examine actual sentence 
outcomes in death penalty jurisdictions across the nation have found 
that White victims are significantly more likely to prompt death 
sentences than Black victims after controlling for legally relevant 
factors.175  Findings from the capital context also indicate an 
interaction effect, in which mock jurors will most likely sentence Black 
defendants convicted of killing White victims to death.176  Finally, 
recent work re-examining these studies177 to consider both race and 
gender of victims, has found that cases involving Black male victims 
were the least likely to result in a death sentence.178 
In the non-capital homicide context, studies that use actual case 
outcome data from varied U.S. jurisdictions suggest that juries are 
 
 174  See, e.g., DAVID C. BALDUS, GEORGE WOODWORTH & CHARLES A. PULASKI, EQUAL 
JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1990) [hereinafter 
BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE]; David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death 
Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview with Recent Findings from 
Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638 (1997) [hereinafter Baldus et al., Racial 
Discrimination]; John J. Donohue, An Empirical Evaluation of the Connecticut Death Penalty 
System Since 1973: Are There Unlawful Racial, Gender, and Geographic Disparities?, 11 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 637, 696 (2014); Radha Iyengar, Who’s the Fairest in the Land? 
Analysis of Judge and Jury Death Penalty Decisions, 54 J.L. & ECON. 693 (2011); Sheri Lynn 
Johnson et al., The Delaware Death Penalty: An Empirical Study, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1925 
(2011).  Contradicting the longstanding, robust findings of these differences is Wesley 
G. Jennings et al., A Critical Examination of the “White Victim Effect” and Death Penalty 
Decision-Making from a Propensity Score Matching Approach: The North Carolina Experience, 
42 J. CRIM. JUST. 384 (2014). 
 175  See supra note 174 and accompanying text.  Note especially BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL 
JUSTICE, supra note 174, and Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination supra note 174.  See also 
U.S. GOV’T ACCT. OFF., GGD-90-57, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES 
PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES (Feb. 1990), http://www.gao.gov/assets/220/ 
212180.pdf; Raymond Paternoster & Robert Brame, Reassessing Race Disparities in 
Maryland Capital Cases, 46 CRIMINOLOGY 971 (2008). 
 176  See supra note 174 and accompanying text; see also Lynch & Haney, 
Discrimination, supra note 165.  
 177  Marian R. Williams, Stephen Demuth & Jefferson E. Holcomb, Understanding 
the Influence of Victim Gender in Death Penalty Cases: The Importance of Victim Race, Sex-
Related Victimization, and Jury Decision Making, 45 CRIMINOLOGY 865, 868 (2007).  
 178  Id. at 865.   
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more lenient toward defendants who have killed non-Whites,179 men,180 
and those whose victims “physically provoked” the defendant.181  Other 
research using experimental methodology has found that Black and 
Latino child sexual assault victims are viewed by mock jurors as more 
responsible for their own abuse than White victims; however, that did 
not translate into less culpability for the defendant.182  Conversely, 
mock juror research using “hate crime” case facts indicates that Black 
victims prompt stronger assessments of guilt and more severe 
punishment recommendations relative to cases involving White 
victims.183  This finding lends support to Sommers and Ellsworth’s 
thesis that race “salience” counteracts derogation of minorities in the 
criminal justice system.184 
In regard to victim-juror interactions, as noted above, prior mock 
jury research indicates that women are more conviction-prone in 
sexual violence cases involving female and child victims.185  In 
experimental research using an acquaintance rape case scenario, 
researchers found that men and women differ in their assessments of 
the case, with women expressing more support for victims.186  Both 
male and female mock jurors, however, devalue Black female victims 
relative to White female victims.187  Australian researchers have 
examined the interactions of juror gender with the male defendant’s 
and female victim’s race, respectively, among a White Australian 
participant group who rendered verdict preferences and sentence 
recommendations after reading about a non-capital murder case.188  
Findings indicated that, “female mock jurors were particularly severe 
toward the Black defendant in comparison to the White defendant and 
were more punitive toward the Black defendant than their male 
 
 179  Eric P. Baumer, Steven F. Messner & Richard B. Felson, The Role of Victim 
Characteristics in the Disposition of Murder Cases, 17 JUST. Q. 281, 299 (2000); Theodore 
R. Curry, The Conditional Effects of Victim and Offender Ethnicity and Victim Gender on 
Sentences for Non-capital Cases, 12 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 438, 449–52 (2010).  
 180  Curry, supra note 179.  
 181  Id.; Baumer, et al., supra note 179, at 290. 
 182  Bottoms, Davis & Epstein, supra note 156, at 2122.  
 183  Marcus-Newhall et al., supra note 173, at 130. 
 184  Sommers & Ellsworth, Race Salience, supra note 172, at 606. 
 185  Bottoms, Review, supra note 156; see also Schutt & Hosch, supra note 157. 
 186  Linda A. Foley et al., Date Rape: Effects of Race of Assailant and Victim and Gender 
of Subjects on Perceptions, 21 J. BLACK PSYCHOL. 6, 12 (1995).  
 187  See id. at 6; see also Roxanne A. Donovan, To Blame or Not to Blame Influences of 
Target Race and Observer Sex on Rape Blame Attribution, 22 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 722 
(2007) (demonstrating more victim blame of Black rape victims by White male study 
participants, but not White female study participants).  
 188  Robert Forster Lee et al., The Effects of Defendant Race, Victim Race, and Juror 
Gender on Evidence Processing in a Murder Trial, 24 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 179 (2006). 
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counterparts.”189  Across both male and female participants, the 
“defendant was given a more punitive sentence for the Black victim as 
compared to the White victim,”190 which directly contrasts the 
American studies discussed supra.191 
4. Self-defense Cases and Juror Judgment 
Finally, in regard to case facts relevant to the Zimmerman trial, 
some empirical research exists discussing how laypersons consider 
claims of self-defense; however, most of the research is specific to 
Battered Woman’s Syndrome and the effect of expert testimony on 
judgments of guilt.192  Dan Kahan and Donald Braman, however, 
conducted a study that examined lay judgments in two very divergent 
cases of self-defense: a battered woman scenario involving a woman 
who shot and killed her abusive husband while he slept; and a scenario 
involving a White forty-two-year-old male commuter who fatally shot a 
Black seventeen-year-old young man who had asked the defendant for 
money on a subway platform, which the defendant interpreted as 
threatening based on his previous victimizing experiences.193  In this 
study, the researchers focused on how political beliefs, cultural 
worldviews, and other such cognitions shaped assessments of the 
cases.194  Kahan and Braman’s findings also speak to demographic 
differences in how these two different uses of the self-defense 
justification are interpreted.195 
A nationally representative sample of 1600 American adults 
participated online in Kahan and Braman’s study and were assigned to 
one of the two self-defense conditions.196  In both scenarios, the 
“danger” posed by the victim was made ambiguous, as were the 
defendants’ ability to flee or retreat without using violence.197  The 
findings reveal significant differences in predictors of acquittal as a 
function of case type.  Overall, findings of guilt were much lower (33% 
versus 47%) for the White commuter scenario compared to the 
 
 189  Id. at 192–93.  
 190  Id. at 189.   
 191  Baumer et al., supra note 179; Curry, supra note 179. 
 192  See DEVINE, JURY DECISION MAKING, supra note 135, at 134–36 for a discussion of 
this work. 
 193  Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, The Self-defensive Cognition of Self-defense, 45 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 64–65 (2008). 
 194  Id.  
 195  Id.  
 196  Id. at 27.  
 197  Id. at 28–34.   
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battered woman scenario.198  Whites and political conservatives were 
significantly more likely to acquit in the White commuter case, with 
only 29% of Whites finding the defendant guilty compared to 56% of 
Black participants finding him guilty.199  The researchers modeled the 
decision-making process and found that being White, female, 
politically conservative, less educated, and ascribing to hierarchical 
and individualist worldviews all predicted pro-defendant 
interpretation of the evidence in the White commuter scenario case 
which then led to a preference for acquittal.200  Notably, political 
conservatism and hierarchical worldviews had the opposite effect in 
the battered woman scenario.201  Thus, beliefs (likely often shaped by 
demographics) become an interpretive tool for making sense of 
ambiguous facts in such cases. 
This study is the most relevant systematic empirical examination 
of laypersons’ interpretation of case facts with some resonance to the 
Zimmerman case.  Indeed, above and beyond political and worldview 
perspectives, White female jurors were especially prone to acquittal in 
the White commuter scenario.202  Given that five of the six Zimmerman 
jurors were White women,203 this suggests that a finding of guilt with 
this particular group would be harder to achieve than with a more 
diverse group.  This study also clearly shows that the particulars of the 
kind of self-defense case significantly interact with juror 
characteristics.204  The acquitting juror in the White commuter 
scenario looks more like a convicting juror in other criminal matters, 
both demographically and attitudinally. 
C. From Jurors to Juries 
The vast majority of experimental trial simulation research has 
focused on individual responses to criminal cases rather than group 
decision-making processes, which limits the findings’ applicability to 
the “real world” conditions in which juries deliberate to a verdict.205  
 
 198  Id.  
 199  Kahan & Braman, supra note 193, at 42.  Political conservatives were also less 
likely to find him guilty (23%) than were liberals (43%).  Id.  
 200  Id. at 45–46. 
 201  Id. at 52–53.  
 202  Id.  
 203  Buckley, supra note 40.  The sixth juror was an Hispanic woman who, post-
verdict, revealed that she supported conviction on second degree murder, but was 
bullied into going along with acquittal.  
 204  Kahan & Braman, supra note 193, at 54. 
 205  This “external validity” critique is just one of several, including the pervasive use 
of college students as participants and the unrealistic stimulus materials (often written 
BELL & LYNCH (DO NOT DELETE) 1/28/2016  12:29 PM 
446 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:361 
While a relatively large and consistent body of research indicates that 
majority pre-deliberation preferences do predict final verdicts,206 a 
number of features of the group process (both in terms of composition 
and deliberative process) are important to the resolution of cases.207  In 
short, the group outcome is not always the sum of its individuals’ 
preferences.  In this section, this Article will first review the research 
on jury composition effects, including the demographic make-up of 
the group and the specific issue of the jury size, and then will discuss 
research relevant to the jury deliberation and decision-making process. 
1. The Construction of Juries and Challenges to Diversity 
Many scholars have revealed that systematic demographic bias is 
built into our system of identifying potential jurors for service and then 
selecting them to serve.208  Hiroshi Fukurai and Richard Krooth suggest 
that “each and every stage of jury selection excludes a disproportionate 
number of racial and ethnic minorities from effectively serving as 
jurors.”209  This is partially driven by factors such as residential stability 
(which correlates with economic stability, ethnicity, and age) since a 
primary mode of identifying eligible jurors is through the voting 
rolls.210  The blanket exclusions that many districts impose, based on 
citizenship status,211 language skills,212 and felony record,213 also serve to 
homogenize jury pools.  Once called to service, the jury selection 
process further biases the composition of seated juries, particularly in 
capital cases.214 
 
summaries or abbreviated transcripts) used to simulate the trial.  See Shari Seidman 
Diamond, Illuminations and Shadows from Jury Simulations, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 561 
(1997) for an early critique and DEVINE, JURY DECISION MAKING, supra note 135, at 23 
for a more recent one.  
 206  KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121; HASTIE ET AL., supra note 132. 
 207  Diamond, supra note 205, at 56466.  See Lynch & Haney, supra note 136, at 95, 
for a discussion of this in a capital penalty context.  
 208  See, e.g., HIROSHI FUKURAI, EDGAR W. BUTLER & RICHARD KROOTH, RACE AND THE 
JURY (1993); HIROSHI FUKURAI & RICHARD KROOTH, RACE IN THE JURY BOX: AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION IN JURY SELECTION  (2003); Ronald Randall, James A. Woods & Robert G. 
Martin, Racial Representativeness Of Juries: An Analysis of Source List and Administrative 
Effects on The Jury Pool, 29 JUST. SYS. J. 71 (2008); Mary R. Rose, Access to Juries: Some 
Puzzles Regarding Race and Jury Participation, 12 SOC. CRIME L. & DEVIANCE 119 (2009). 
 209  FUKURAI & KROOTH, supra note 208, at 2; see also Randall, supra note, at 81.   
 210  Rose, supra note 208, at 124.  
 211  Id. at 126.  
 212  Id. 
 213  James M. Binnall, A Field Study of the Presumptively Biased: Is There Empirical Support 
for Excluding Convicted Felons from Jury Service?, 36 LAW & POL’Y 1 (2014); Darren 
Wheelock, A Jury of One’s “Peers”: The Racial Impact of Felon Jury Exclusion in Georgia, 32 
JUST. SYS. J. 335 (2011). 
 214  In general, the process by which potential jurors are excused in criminal cases 
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The use of peremptory challenges contributes to the selection 
bias during voir dire, particularly when used by prosecutors.215  Samuel 
Sommers and Michael Norton conducted experiments to test whether 
peremptory use was race-based and to document how the apparent 
race-based use was justified in race-neutral terms.  The researchers 
found that across three different samples of participants, individuals 
who role-played as prosecutors in a Black defendant criminal case were 
significantly more likely to exclude potential Black jurors compared to 
otherwise identical potential White jurors.216  Participants in each study 
derived wholly race-neutral justifications for their exclusions in 92–
94% of the cases.217  While such biased exclusion is especially likely, and 
especially problematic, in cases involving non-White defendants, it 
pervades as a practice no matter the race of the defendant given the 
presumption that Black jurors are acquittal-prone.218 
In the death penalty context, prosecutors appeared to view Black 
venire members as less likely to sentence to death and, as a result, 
prosecutors disproportionately struck these members during voir 
 
disproportionately removes people of color, young people, and women.  See Shamena 
Anwar, Patrick J. Bayer & Randi Hjalmarsson, The Role of Age in Jury Selection and Trial 
Outcomes (Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID), Working Paper No. 146, 
2013), on the issue of age biasing.  In capital cases the requisite death qualification 
procedure exacerbates this bias.  See Haney, Hurtado & Vega, supra note 145, at 
62930; Alicia Summers, R. David Hayward & Monica K. Miller, Death Qualification as 
Systematic Exclusion of Jurors with Certain Religious and Other Characteristics, 40 J. APPLIED 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 3218, 322829 (2010).  
 215  In non-capital and capital cases alike, peremptory challenges can and are used 
to remove non-Whites, usually by prosecutors.  See Samuel R. Sommers, & Michael I. 
Norton, Race and Jury Selection: Psychological Perspectives on the Peremptory Challenge Debate, 
63 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 527 (2008) [hereinafter Sommers & Norton, Race and Jury 
Selection].  For gender-based exclusions, see Michael I. Norton, Samuel R. Sommers & 
Sara Brauner, Bias in Jury Selection: Justifying Prohibited Peremptory Challenges, 20 J. BEHAV. 
DECISION MAKING 467 (2007).  For an examination in the capital context, see David C. 
Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A Legal and 
Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3 (2001) [hereinafter Baldus et al., The Use of 
Peremptory Challenges]; Catherin M. Grosso, Barbara O’Brien & George G. Woodworth, 
A Stubborn Legacy: The Overwhelming Importance of Race in Jury Selection in 173 Post-Batson 
North Carolina Capital Trials, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1531 (2012); Melynda J. Price, Performing 
Discretion or Performing Discrimination: Race, Ritual, and Peremptory Challenges in Capital 
Jury Selection, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 57 (2009). 
 216  The participant groups were, respectively, college students, law students, and 
lawyers.  Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Race-Based Judgments, Race-Neutral 
Justifications: Experimental Examination of Peremptory Use and the Batson Challenge Procedure, 
31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 261 (2007). 
 217  See id. at 267 (“Despite the fact that race clearly played a role in peremptory 
judgments, only 7% of college students, 6% of law students, and 8% of attorneys cited 
race as influential.”).   
 218  Billy M. Turner et al., Race and Peremptory Challenges During Voir Dire: Do 
Prosecution and Defense Agree?, 14 J. CRIM. JUST. 61 (1986).  
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dire.219  For instance, David Baldus and his colleagues documented the 
peremptory strike practices in 317 Philadelphia capital cases over a 
sixteen-year-period, finding that prosecutors were especially likely to 
excuse young Black men from serving, and they primary excluded 
Black potential jurors of all ages and both genders.220 
In cases like Zimmerman’s, Black venire members would likely be 
viewed as liabilities to the defense rather than to the prosecution; 
indeed, the defense used two of their three exercised strikes against 
Black potential jurors, while six of the seven strikes that the 
prosecution attempted to exercise were of White women.221  The 
defense also challenged the prosecution’s sequential strike of four 
White women on Batson grounds; the judge overturned two of those 
strikes.222 
2. Biasing Effects of Jury Homogeneity 
Given what we know about the similarity-leniency bias and the 
operation of subtle forms of White racism against minorities in 
judgment settings,223 the demographic skewing of criminal juries can 
lead to disparities in verdict outcomes above and beyond the individual 
juror-level effects described previously.  Indeed, a growing body of 
research indicates that jury group diversity improves the quality of 
deliberation and decision-making through the very process of bringing 
together persons with different backgrounds, life experiences, and 
perspectives.224 
 
 
 
 219  Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges, supra note 215, at 124; Grosso et 
al., supra note 215, at 1548. 
 220  Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges, supra note 215, at 121–22. 
 221  Michael Smerconish, Did Gender, Not Race, Decide Zimmerman Verdict?, SUN 
SENTINEL (Aug. 3, 2013), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2013-08-03/news/fl-mscol-
zimmerman-oped0803-20130803_1_not-guilty-verdict-george-zimmerman-jury-
consultant. 
 222   In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the U. S. Supreme Court ruled that 
the defendant’s equal protection rights were violated when the prosecutor used 
peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors on the basis of race.  Jury Selected 
in George Zimmerman Murder Trial, CLICK ORLANDO (June 20, 2013), 
http://www.clickorlando.com/news/jury-seated-in-george-zimmerman-murder-
trial/20648712. 
 223  For review of similarity-leniency, see Devine et al., 45 Years, supra note 135.  For 
White racism in judgment settings, see Sommers & Ellsworth, White Juror Bias, supra 
note 172. 
 224  Samuel R. Sommers, Race and the Decision Making of Juries, 12 LEGAL & 
CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 171 (2007).  For capital context, see Lynch and Haney, 
supra note 136. 
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Sommers experimentally examined the decision-making 
processes of twenty-nine six-person mock juries that considered a 
criminal case involving a Black defendant.225  Half of the mock jury 
groups were “diverse,” comprised of two Blacks and four Whites, and 
the other half were all-White.226  Sommers found that the diverse 
groups deliberated longer, discussed more of the case facts, and were 
less likely to assert inaccurate facts or information in comparison to 
the all-White groups.227  These findings indicated that jurors in diverse 
groups engaged in more systematic information processing and more 
careful consideration of relevant case facts, leading Sommers to 
conclude that in “every deliberation measure examined in the present 
research, heterogeneous groups outperformed homogeneous 
groups.”228 
Research has portrayed White-dominated juries as more 
conviction-prone and punitive against non-White defendants than 
more diverse juries.229  For instance, Marian Williams and Melissa 
Burek examined felony trial outcomes from four large jurisdictions in 
the United States and found that “juries with a higher percentage of 
whites serving on them were more likely to convict black 
defendants,”230 after controlling for legally relevant case factors. 
Shamena Anwar, Patrick Bayer, and Randi Hjalmarsson examined 
the impact of jury racial composition on 731 non-capital criminal trial 
outcomes in Sarasota County and Lake County, Florida between 2000 
and 2010, uncovering a significant impact of jury pool diversity on case 
outcomes.231  Specifically, “in cases with no blacks in the jury pool, black 
defendants are convicted at an 81% rate and white defendants at a 66% 
rate.  When the jury pool includes at least one black potential juror, 
conviction rates are almost identical: 71% for black defendants and 
 
 225  Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identifying 
Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 597, 60203 (2006).  
 226  Id. at 601.  
 227  Id. at 604–06.  
 228  Id. at 608.  
 229  Williams & Burek, supra note 127.  For out-group punitiveness against Latino 
defendants by White-dominated juries, see Delores A. Perez et al., Ethnicity of Defendants 
and Jurors as Influences on Jury Decisions, 23 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1249 (1993).  But 
see, Howard C. Daudistel et al., Effects of Defendant Ethnicity on Juries’ Dispositions of Felony 
Cases, 29 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 317 (1999) for a finding of significant out-group bias 
against White defendants among Latino-dominated juries in Texas. 
 230  Daudistel et al., supra note 229; Williams & Burek, supra note 127, at 164. 
 231  Shamena Anwar, Patrick Bayer & Randi Hjalmarsson, The Impact of Jury Race in 
Criminal Trials, 127 Q. J. ECON. 1017 (2012). 
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73% for white defendants.”232  The finding holds for jury composition 
itself, in that juries with at least one Black juror seated led to almost 
identical conviction rates, regardless of defendant race.233 
In the death penalty context, William Bowers and his colleagues 
have demonstrated a “white male dominance” effect, whereby capital 
juries with five or more White men are dramatically more likely to 
sentence to death Black defendants who kill White victims in 
comparison to similar cases without such a concentration of White 
men as jurors.234  Conversely, Bowers and his colleagues also identified 
a “black male presence’’ effect, whereby having at least one Black man 
on the jury significantly reduced the likelihood of a death sentence in 
Black defendant-White victim cases.235 
Experimental research also observed the “white male dominance” 
effect on capital sentencing where small group juries comprised of 
33% or more White men favored death in 86% of the Black defendant 
cases, but only in 63% of the otherwise identical White defendant 
cases.236  In contrast, the groups not dominated by White men did not 
differentiate their sentence determination by race of defendant.237  
Very little research exists on how juries as groups differentially 
deliberate, in either capital or non-capital settings, as a function of 
their own composition in concert with victim characteristics.  Outside 
of the Bowers et al. research on capital juries described above, research 
on victim effects has generally not examined interactions between 
victim demographics and jury composition factors. 
3. Group Decision-Making Processes 
As noted earlier, the Chicago Jury Project findings indicated a 
“net jury leniency”238 in criminal verdicts when compared to judges’ 
assessments of cases.  This finding stimulated two bodies of research, 
the first of which examined how jurors and juries rely upon “extra-
legal” factors, including sentiment or prejudice, in their judgments 
 
 232  Id. at 1019.  
 233  Id.  
 234  William J. Bowers, Benjamin D. Steiner & Marla Sandys, Death Sentencing in Black 
and White: An Empirical Analysis of the Role of Jurors’ Race and Jury Racial Composition, 3 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 171, 192–94 (2001); William J. Bowers, Marla Sandys & Thomas W. 
Brewer, Crossing Racial Boundaries: A Closer Look at the Roots of Racial Bias in Capital 
Sentencing When the Defendant is Black and the Victim is White, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1497, 
1501 (2004).  
 235  Bowers, Sandys & Brewer, supra note 234, at 1501.  
 236  Lynch & Haney, supra note 136, at 78, 84–85.  
 237  See id. at 84–85.  
 238  Robert J. MacCoun & Norbert L. Kerr, Asymmetric Influence in Mock Jury 
Deliberation: Jurors’ Bias for Leniency, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 21, 21 (1988). 
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when liberated from the evidence due to its ambiguous or equivocal 
nature, as detailed above.239  The finding that juries will more likely 
acquit than judges in weaker evidence cases has since been replicated, 
with recent researchers hypothesizing that “judges have a lower 
conviction threshold than juries.”240  The second body of research 
asked whether the group deliberation process itself produces a 
leniency bias.241  The original Chicago Jury Project analyses did not 
support this hypothesis, finding instead that individual jurors’ pre-
deliberation assessments would generally predict verdict outcomes in 
a relatively straightforward manner, which suggested that the group 
decision-making process had little real effect on final verdicts.242 
Subsequent research has challenged that supposition, 
demonstrating that an asymmetric majority-preference tipping point 
seems to operate in criminal case scenarios.243  Thus, a meta-analysis of 
both experimental and field research jury studies indicates that if two-
thirds of the jury members have a preference for an acquittal pre-
deliberation, that will be the end verdict about 94% of the time, 
whereas the same majority favoring conviction pre-deliberation leads 
to just two-thirds, about 67%, of those final verdicts being 
convictions.244  Moreover, in cases with even splits in pre-deliberation 
verdict preferences, jury units are about four times as likely to acquit 
as they are to convict.245  The “leniency asymmetry effect” is not a 
general tendency towards acquittal; rather it is such that “a given 
faction favoring acquittal will tend to have a greater chance of 
prevailing than would an equivalently sized faction favoring 
conviction.”246  Robert Kerr and Norbert MacCoun suggest that this 
 
 239  Id. 
 240  Theodore Eisenberg et al., Judge-Jury Agreement in Criminal Cases: A Partial 
Replication of Kalven and Zeisel’s The American Jury, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 171, 172 
(2005).  
 241  MacCoun & Kerr, supra note 238, at 21. 
 242  KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 288 (reporting further that in cases where 
there was an even split on the first ballot, half of the final verdicts were acquittals and 
half were convictions); Broeder, supra note 118, at 747 (reporting that analysis of the 
interviews with 1500 jurors from 213 cases indicated that juries almost universally took 
a first ballot “immediately” once retiring to deliberate, and “the majority on the first 
ballot almost always won.  The majority won in approximately ninety percent of such 
cases”). 
 243  See, e.g., MacCoun & Kerr, supra note 238, at 22. 
 244  Id. at 30 (reporting on a meta-analysis of eleven studies that indicated a robust 
leniency “asymmetry effect”).  
 245  Id.  
 246  Norbert L. Kerr & Robert J. MacCoun, Is the Leniency Asymmetry Really Dead? 
Misinterpreting Asymmetry Effects in Criminal Jury Deliberation, 15 GROUP PROCESSES & 
INTERGROUP REL. 585, 586 (2012).  In this article, the authors reanalyze data reported 
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bias likely derives from the specific burden of proof in criminal cases, 
the “reasonable doubt” standard, since the effect disappears under a 
“preponderance of evidence” standard.247  The bias will also most likely 
be present when the evidence is equivocal as to guilt, in that 
uncertainty pushes the group decision toward acquittal.248 
Research suggests that deliberation styles can influence outcomes.  
Scholars have delineated two primary types of deliberations: verdict-
driven, where the jury polls its members frequently and frames 
discussion around determining the appropriate verdict outcome;249 
and evidence-driven, whereby juries work to narratively construct an 
understanding of what happened without voicing verdict preferences, 
then select the verdict that best fits the constructed narrative.250  Recent 
work by Nicole Waters and Valerie Hans indicates that deliberation 
styles impact whether and how individual jurors conform to, or dissent 
from, the majority.251  Using a data set of interviews with nearly 3500 
previous jurors from criminal trials in four different urban locations, 
Waters and Hans first found that about 10% of the sample disagreed 
with the majority preference at the end of deliberations although over 
three-quarters of those “dissenters” went along with the majority 
preference to achieve a unanimous verdict (characterized as 
“conformers”).252  The remaining 23% were “holdouts” who caused the 
jury to hang.253  Collectively, “[o]ver half the juries (54 percent) 
included at least one juror whose one-person jury verdict diverged 
from the final vote of the jury.”254  The likelihood of having either kind 
of dissenter was strongly associated with deliberation style, in that those 
juries that had early votes and secret ballots especially seemed to 
 
since the publication of the 1988 “Asymmetric Influence” that called into question the 
leniency asymmetry for actual juries, and found that while the effect was stronger for 
“mock juries” it was also present for actual juries.  
 247  MacCoun & Kerr, supra note 238, at 27–30; see also Lynch & Haney, Capital Jury, 
supra note 165 (demonstrating in the California capital penalty-phase context, which 
has a preponderance standard, there appears to be a punitive asymmetry effect).  
 248  Kerr & MacCoun, supra note 246, at 598–99.  
 249  See Valerie P. Hans, Deliberation and Dissent: 12 Angry Men Versus the Empirical 
Reality of Juries, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 579, 585 (2007).  
 250  See generally HASTIE ET AL., supra note 132.  As Devine points out, deliberations 
are often a combination of the two styles.  DEVINE, JURY DECISION MAKING, supra note 
135, at 157. 
 251  Nicole L. Waters & Valerie P. Hans, A Jury of One: Opinion Formation, Conformity, 
and Dissent on Juries, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDS. 513 (2009). 
 252  Id. at 525 (converting into percentages from last line of Table 2).  
 253  Id. at 527 (converting into percentages portion of total “dissenters,” N=351 that 
were “holdouts,” N=82). 
 254  Id. at 523.  
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generate dissenters.255 
Additionally, those jurors especially likely to be conforming 
dissenters—going along with the verdict without agreeing with it—
were those who favored convictions.  Only 12.5% of conviction-
favoring dissenters held out, whereas 35% of acquittal-favoring 
dissenters held out.256  Dissenters in general felt less likely to influence 
during the deliberations and saw their peers as less open-minded.257 
Finally, experimental research has found that some jurors are 
more likely to be given authority than others within deliberations.  
Whites, males, and more highly educated jurors are disproportionately 
likely to become forepersons.258  Forepersons, in turn, are highly 
influential in shaping deliberations259 and outcomes.260  Even among 
the rest of the jurors, research suggests that demographic 
characteristics predict a member’s influence on others’ opinions.  Men 
and those of higher socio-economic status are both perceived to be 
more influential to others and actually do participate more in 
deliberations.261  Recent evidence shows that some jurors may be 
negative influences, driving others away from their positions.262  Jessica 
Salerno, for instance, manipulated the gender of an angry holdout in 
a simulated deliberation and found that when female holdouts 
expressed anger in deliberations, they produced a boomerang effect, 
causing study participants (both male and female) to become even 
more confident in their own divergent viewpoints.263  Conversely, angry 
male holdouts eroded participants’ confidence in their own verdict 
preferences and pulled them toward the holdout.264 
 
 255  Id. at 526.  
 256  Id. at 525.  
 257  Waters & Hans, supra note 251, at 528.  
 258  DEVINE, JURY DECISION MAKING, supra note 135, at 154–55.  
 259  Shari Seidman Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict 
Consequences: Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury, 226 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513 (1992); Erin 
York & Benjamin Cornwell, Status on Trial: Social Characteristics and Influence in the Jury 
Room, 85 SOC. FORCES 455 (2006). 
 260  Dennis J. Devine et al., Deliberation Quality: A Preliminary Examination in Criminal 
Juries, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDS. 273 (2007). 
 261  DEVINE, JURY DECISION MAKING, supra note 135, at 166–67 (reviewing several 
studies that report such findings).  
 262  Jessica M. Salerno, One Angry Woman: Emotion Expression and Minority 
Influence in a Jury Deliberation Context (2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Illinois at Chicago) (on file with the University of Illinois at Chicago, 
available at https://indigo.uic.edu/bitstream/handle/10027/9602/ 
Salerno_Jessica.pdf?sequence=1). 
 263  Id.  
 264  Id. at 52–54.  
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4. Six- vs. Twelve-Person Juries 
Jury size remains the final relevant consideration of the jury 
research.  In 1970, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld as constitutional 
Florida’s practice of using six-person juries in felony criminal trials in 
the case of Williams v. Florida.265  The Court referred to the difference 
between six-person and twelve-person juries as likely “negligible” in 
terms of its composition and function,266 a view vehemently rejected by 
the leading jury scholars at the time.267  In the wake of this decision, for 
instance, Hans Zeisel portended a significant negative effect on the 
jury as a legal institution.268  Zeisel focused on two concerns: the impact 
on diversity of the jury as a body, and the impact on stability in 
outcomes across groups.269  On the first concern, he estimated that for 
any minority group that comprises 10% of the population, 
approximately 72% of twelve-person juries would include at least one 
member of that group.270  That estimate drops to 47% of all six-person 
juries, thereby excluding that minority group completely from more 
than half of all juries.271  On the second concern, using probability 
estimates, Zeisel suggested that the decrease in jury size would increase 
the unpredictability of jury verdicts by approximately 41%, based on 
the increased variability in diversity between juries.272  Since Zeisel 
made these predictions, empirical research has largely borne him 
out.273 
In 1997, Michael Saks and Mollie Marti conducted a meta-analysis 
of eighteen studies that looked at the effect of group size on a number 
of variables, including diversity of representation, length and quality 
of deliberations, and variability in outcomes.274  The researchers found 
that smaller juries were less diverse, deliberated for shorter periods of 
time, and, in several of the studies, jurors discussed fewer relevant case 
 
 265  399 U.S. 78 (1970).  
 266  Id. at 102.  
 267  DEVINE, JURY DECISION MAKING, supra note 135, at 42.  
 268  Hans Zeisel, Six Man Juries, Majority Verdicts: What Difference Do They Make? 
3 (1973) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of Chicago Law School 
Occasional Papers, available at  http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/view 
content.cgi?article=1023&context=occasional_papers).  
 269  Id. at 4. 
 270  Id.  
 271  Id.  
 272  Id.  
 273  See, for example, Michael J. Saks & Mollie Weighner Marti, A Meta-Analysis of 
the Effects of Jury Size, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 451 (1997), for a meta-analysis of studies 
that looked at jury size as an independent variable.  
 274  Id.  
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facts and had poorer recall for case details.275  No systematic differences 
in outcomes existed when juries reached a verdict, but there was a 
slightly higher likelihood of a hung jury with twelve-person juries.276  
This may well be the product of increased diversity of thought, as well 
as the higher likelihood that more than one dissenter will be present 
on twelve-person juries compared to six-person juries.  Social 
psychological research on social influence and conformity has long 
shown that a single dissenter in a group judgment is more susceptible 
to pressure to conform than are pairs or other minority factions, at a 
frequency much greater than dissenting proportion would predict.277  
In other words, although a 210 split is proportionately equivalent to 
a 15 split, the latter dissenter will much more likely succumb to the 
majority group influence. 
Because variety in perspectives among jury members may be partly 
driven by diverse life experiences, demographic characteristics, and 
social positions, the threat to jury heterogeneity posed by the six-
person jury remains a major concern for jury researchers.278  Shari 
Diamond, Destiny Peery, Francis Dolan, and Emily Dolan compared 
racial and ethnic heterogeneity of six-person versus twelve-person civil 
juries in Cook County, Illinois where the default jury size was six, unless 
a party demanded a twelve-person jury and paid the additional fees to 
empanel one.279  The data were collected between 2001 and 2007, 
yielding 89 six-person juries and 188 twelve-person juries that had been 
selected from a venire pool that was 25% Black, 8% Latino, 63% White, 
and 4% other race/ethnicity or unknown.280 
Findings indicated that nearly three out of every ten six-person 
juries contained no Black members and another three out of ten had 
only one Black member.281  Only 2% of the twelve-person juries had no 
 
 275  Id. at 457. 
 276  Id. at 459–61 (indicating that the actual effect size under real world conditions 
due to the common experimental design feature of presenting “ambiguous” cases, 
rather than cases with strong evidence toward conviction or acquittal).  
 277  Psychologist Solomon Asch was the pioneer in-group conformity research.  See 
Solomon E. Asch, Studies of Independence and Conformity: I. A Minority Of One Against A 
Unanimous Majority, 70 PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPHS: GEN. & APPLIED 1 (1956).  For a recent 
meta-analysis of group conformity studies, see Rod Bond, Group Size and Conformity, 8 
GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 331 (2005).  
 278  See, e.g., Alisa Smith & Michael J. Saks, The Case for Overturning Williams v. Florida 
and the Six-Person Jury: History, Law, and Empirical Evidence, 60 FLA. L. REV. 441 (2008).  
 279  Shari Seidman Diamond, Destiny Peery, Francis J. Dolan & Emily Dolan, 
Achieving Diversity on the Jury: Jury Size and the Peremptory Challenge, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 425, 435 (2009). 
 280  Id.  
 281  Id. at 442.  
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Black members and another 16% had just one Black member.282  Two-
thirds of the six-person juries included no Hispanic members; that 
percentage was much lower (40%) with twelve-person juries.283  Thus, 
while the selection process in this context did not further erode the 
representativeness of the seated juries, these findings directly 
demonstrate the increased risk of demographic homogeneity that 
attends six-person juries.284 
Perhaps most on point is the work by economists Anwar, Bayer, 
and Hjalmarsson in Florida, described supra.285  The data in this study 
indicated that 36% of the jury pools286 for the criminal trials included 
no Black potential jurors, and 72% of the seated six-person juries did 
not include a single Black juror.287  The disparity problem in 
convictions that the researchers demonstrated was therefore 
exacerbated by the widespread exclusion of Black jury members that 
comes with the six-person jury.288  Thus, forty years after Zeisel issued 
his warnings about the impact of Williams on the jury’s functionality 
and representativeness, Anwar and her colleagues directly linked 
Zeisel’s two concerns explicitly to the problem of racial disparities in 
case outcomes, arguing that: 
[A] potentially desirable feature of a justice system is that jury 
verdicts are not arbitrary given the evidence.  In this context, 
increasing the number of jurors on the seated jury would 
substantially reduce the variability of the trial outcomes, 
increase black representation in the jury pool and on seated 
juries, and make trial outcomes more equal for white and 
black defendants.289 
 
 
 
 
 
 282  Id.   
 283  Id. at 444.  
 284  Id. at 449 (concluding that the most straightforward solution to homogeneous 
juries is “a return to the 12-member jury”).  
 285  Anwar et al., supra note 231.  
 286  Id. at 1019 (the mean pool size per felony trial in the sample was twenty-seven 
persons).  
 287  Id. at 1029 (summary statistics table).  
 288  Id. at 1035 (reporting a 16% gap in the rate of convictions between Blacks and 
Whites when no Blacks were on the jury; the gap disappeared when there was at least 
one Black juror). 
 289  Id. at 1049.  
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IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPERATIVE OF DIVERSE JURIES & 
CHALLENGES TO THEIR REALIZATION 
A. Jury Representativeness and the Right to Exclude 
The Supreme Court has long maintained that the selection of a 
jury that adequately represents the broader community is important to 
both fundamental rights and democracy.290  In Taylor v. Louisiana, 
Justice White noted that “the selection of a petit jury from a 
representative cross section of the community is an essential 
component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.”291  A 
representative jury, recognized by the Court for more than 100 years 
as part of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment’s right to an impartial jury, 
does not exclude any significant group in society.292 
Over 100 years ago, a jury of one’s peers included people of 
different races.  One of the first cases to address the issue of a 
defendant’s rights to a racially diverse jury was the 1879 case of Strauder 
v. West Virginia.293  The defendant, a freed slave, sought to move his 
criminal trial from state court to federal court.294  At the time, West 
Virginia law excluded Blacks from serving on grand and petit juries.295  
The defendant argued that the absence of Blacks from the jury 
prevented him from receiving a fair trial.296  The Supreme Court 
agreed and upheld his claim.297 
The entitlement to a jury that represents a fair cross-section of 
society has two key components.  First, persons of the defendant’s own 
race cannot be excluded.  Second, and more broadly, even in cases in 
which the defendant is, for example, a White male, minorities and 
women should not be excluded from the jury pool as a matter of 
fairness to the defendant.298  This has far broader implications for the 
jury as an institution than does a defendant’s claim for inclusion of 
jurors who look like him or her.  For instance, in Taylor v. Louisiana, 
the Court entertained a challenge posed by a male defendant who 
argued that the Louisiana law excluding women from jury service 
unless they previously filed written declaration, violated his Sixth 
 
 290  See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975).  
 291  419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975). 
 292  J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 551 U.S. 127, 142 (1994). 
 293  100 U.S. 303 (1879), abrogated on different grounds by Taylor, 419 U.S. at 522. 
 294  Strauder, 100 U.S. at 311. 
 295  Id. at 308. 
 296  Id. at 304. 
 297  Id. at 308. 
 298  Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 422–23 (1991).  
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Amendment right to impartial jury.299  The Court agreed, highlighting 
the central importance of a jury’s representativeness as a general 
principle.300  A representative jury is one that attorneys select from a 
pool that contains a fair cross-section of the community.301  Justice 
White identified the fair-cross-section requirement as “fundamental to 
the jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment”302 that was violated 
by the systematic exclusion of women from the jury.303 
In Taylor v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that 
the notion of representativeness is grounded in the essential function 
of juries as a democratic civic institution as we conceive of them in the 
United States.  In this passage from Taylor, the Court highlights the 
rights of members of various community groups to participate in 
juries304: 
Restricting jury service to only special groups or excluding 
identifiable segments playing major roles in the community 
cannot be squared with the constitutional concept of jury 
trial.  Trial by jury presupposes a jury drawn from a pool 
broadly representative of the community as well as impartial 
in a specific case . . . . [T]he broad representative character 
of the jury should be maintained, partly as assurance of a 
diffused impartiality and partly because sharing in the 
administration of justice is a phase of civic responsibility.305 
As the Court makes clear in the passages cited above, 
representativeness of juries is critical, not just for sake of the parties in 
a given case, but also to democracy itself.  In the Court’s view, 
restricting service to some groups and excluding others undermines 
impartiality and prevents those excluded from fully participating in the 
body politic. 
B. The Effect of the Exclusion on Communities 
Though the holdings in all of the Sixth Amendment cases have 
necessarily been limited to the effect of exclusion on defendants,306 as 
noted above, the Supreme Court has articulated other constitutional 
values inherent in the representativeness requirement in several other 
 
 299  Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 525 (1975). 
 300  Id. at 528. 
 301  Id. at 529. 
 302  Id. at 530–31. 
 303  Id. at 531. 
 304  See generally Taylor, 419 at 530–31. 
 305  Taylor, 419 U.S at 530–31 (internal citations omitted) (alterations in original).  
 306  See id. at 522; Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314, 314 (2010). 
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cases.307  One value, distinct from that of the defendant’s rights, 
concerns the rights of potential jurors to participate in this important 
civic activity.308  The Court clearly stated that nearly all members of 
society are eligible by right to serve on juries.309  In other words, 
excluding women and minorities from participating as jurors violates 
their participatory rights, regardless of defendants’ interests.310  The 
Court recognized these participatory rights as early as Strauder v. West 
Virginia.311  In Strauder, the Court noted that excluding Blacks from 
juries damaged not just Black defendants but also Blacks who might 
participate as jurors.312  The exclusion of Blacks, according to the 
Court, denies the class of potential jurors the “privilege of participating 
equally . . . in the administration of justice.”313  Exclusion from jury 
service also stigmatizes and is “practically a brand upon [individuals], 
affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority.”314 
The Court has ruled that the deliberate exclusion of members of 
a protected class (for instance, based on race or gender) from juries 
constitutes unconstitutional discrimination in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.315  In J.E.B. v. 
Alabama, the Court struck down gender-based peremptory challenges, 
noting not just the harm imposed by gender-based discrimination on 
the defendant and the individual juror, but also its negative impact on 
the community: 
Discrimination in jury selection, whether based on race or on 
gender, causes harm to the litigants, the community, and the 
individual jurors who are wrongfully excluded from 
participation in the judicial process . . . .  The community is 
harmed by the State’s participation in the perpetuation of 
invidious group stereotypes and the inevitable loss of 
confidence in our judicial system that state-sanctioned 
 
 307  Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530. 
 308  Id. at 530–31 (quoting Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter 
J., dissenting)).  
 309  The exceptions include blanket exclusion of felons in jurisdictions that choose 
to do so, exclusions on language ability, and those of citizen status.  On the legal logic 
used to justify felon exclusion, see James M. Binnall, Sixteen Million Angry Men: Reviving 
a Dead Doctrine to Challenge the Constitutionality of Excluding Felons from Jury Service, 17 VA. 
J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 1 (2009); Brian C. Kalt, Exclusion of Felons from Jury Service, 53 AM. U. 
L. REV. 65 (2003).  
 310  Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530. 
 311  100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879), abrogated on different grounds by Taylor, 419 U.S. at 522. 
 312  Id. 
 313  Id.  
 314  Id.  
 315  See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994); Batson v. Kentucky, 
476 U.S. 79, 84–85 (1986). 
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discrimination in the courtroom engenders.316 
In her concurrence, Justice O’Connor articulated the importance of 
gender-based inclusion, like race-based inclusion, to the deliberative 
process, intuiting what social science research has demonstrated: 
“[L]ike race, gender matters . . . . [O]ne need not be a sexist to share 
the intuition that in certain cases a person’s gender and resulting life 
experience will be relevant to his or her view of the case.  ‘Jurors are 
not expected to come into the jury box and leave behind all that their 
human experience has taught them.’”317 
C. Jury Blaming: A Tale of Two Female Dominated Juries 
As previously demonstrated, the selection of juries that adequately 
represent the diverse life experiences and perspectives of the full array 
of community members is a longstanding legal value.  The Court has 
valorized the fair cross-section requirement for its value to individual 
defendants, potential jurors, and society, writ large.  In contrast, 
however, the public sphere has not always been so laudatory, 
particularly in racially charged, controversial cases.  A notable example 
of such criticism existed with the jury of the O.J. Simpson case.318  
Simpson, a Black actor and former professional football player, was 
charged with the 1994 murders of his ex-wife, Nicole Brown Simpson, 
and her friend, Ronald Goldman.319  The jury that heard and decided 
the Simpson case included eight women and four men.320  Eight of 
those jurors were Black, two were Hispanic, and one was half White 
and half American Indian.321  One juror was White.322 
After the jury acquitted Simpson of the murders, many 
commentators accused the jury of being racially biased in favor of the 
 
 316  J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. at 140 (1994).  The notion of community-based 
harms posed by discrimination had also been recognized by the Court in an earlier 
case, Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 627 (1991), where the Court 
noted the effects of how discrimination in jury selection might be received.  
Discrimination in the courtroom, the Court added, “raises serious questions as to the 
fairness of the proceedings conducted there.”  Id. at 628. 
 317  J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 148–49 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Beck v. Alabama, 
447 U.S. 625, 642 (1980)).  
 318  See, e.g., Gerald Uelman, Jury Bashing and the O.J. Simpson Verdict, 20 HARV. J. L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 475, 475–76 (1997).  
 319  People v. O.J. Simpson, No. BA 097211 (Cal. Super. CL, LA. County) (Oct. 3, 
1995); Kenneth B. Noble, A Jury is Chosen to Hear the Simpson Case, N. Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 
1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/11/04/us/a-jury-is-chosen-to-hear- 
the-simpson-murder-case.html.   
 320  Noble, supra note 319.  
 321  Id.  
 322  Id.  
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defendant.323  The day after the verdict’s announcement, the Wall 
Street Journal broadcast the jury’s verdict with the headline, “Color 
Blinded,” implying that the jury’s decision had more to do with the 
jury’s racial composition than the burden of proof.324  The newspaper 
article assumed that the jury refused to convict Simpson because of his 
race, and not because of the prosecution’s failure to provide evidence 
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.325  Similar allegations of racial bias 
were expressed toward the predominantly White jury that acquitted 
the four police officers in 1992 for the 1991 beating of Rodney King.326  
A bystander taped the beating, prompting one law professor to 
comment: “Apparently, it was easy to convince a jury of [W]hite 
suburbanites to disconnect their eyeballs from their brains, and not be 
‘satisfied with seeing.’”327 
Even though female-dominated juries heard both the Simpson 
and Zimmerman cases, the jury in the Zimmerman case fared far 
better in the public sphere than did the jury in the O.J. Simpson case.  
In the Zimmerman case, despite a majority of the jurors being White 
women, there was a rush to explain the jury’s verdict from an 
evidentiary, rather than either a raced or a gendered perspective.328  
After this decision, the Wall Street Journal assigned no blame for the 
failure to convict Zimmerman to the jury’s demographics, 
editorializing that “the state could not prove its case to the satisfaction 
of the six jurors, all women, for whom the easiest decision in terms of 
 
 323  See, e.g., William F. Buckley, The O.J. Verdict Deserves Protest: Outcome Says Nothing 
About Justice, Speaks Volumes on Race Relations, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 10, 1995, at B5 (“It 
is simply undeniable that the black majority believed him innocent because he was 
black.”); Mona Charen, A Triumph for Black Racism, BALTIMORE SUN, Oct. 10, 1995, at 
11A (“Only a nation of fools would lull itself into believing that this was not a racially 
motivated and a racist verdict.”); Martin Gottlieb, Race, Sex, Sports: Divisions Normal, 
DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Oct. 11, 1995, at 10A (“Whites in general do not seem to be driven 
by race.  Absent race, people in general would probably see Simpson as guilty, given 
all the circumstantial evidence that surfaced early and given the enjoyment that people 
get out of hating a rich guy’s lawyers.”); Charles Krauthammer, America’s Show Trial, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 1995, at A25 (“We have lived now for a generation under a theory 
that declares that for officially designated victim classes the ordinary rules do not 
apply.”).  See also Christo Lassiter, The O.J. Simpson Verdict: A Lesson in Black and White, 
1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 69, 81 (1996). 
 324  Benjamin A. Holden, Laurie P. Cohen & Eleena D. Liser, Color Blinded? Race 
Seems to Play an Increasing Role in Many Jury Verdicts, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 1995, at A1.   
 325  Id. 
 326  See, Sam V. Meddis, Many Blacks Think Justice Not Part of System: King Case Reaffirms 
Sentiment, USA TODAY, May 13, 1992, at 8A; Gerald Uelmen, Need for Civilian Police 
Review Revisited, L.A. DAILY J., May 15, 1992, at A4.  
 327  Uelmen, supra note 326.  
 328  Holly McCammon, What Zimmerman’s All-Female Jury Says, CNN (June 24, 2013), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/24/opinion/mccammon-female-jury/. 
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public approval would have been to convict.”329  While the jury in this 
highly publicized and closely watched case consisted entirely of 
women, there was no notable criticism of the controversial verdict 
framed in terms of the jury’s gender composition.  What might that 
tell us about how gender and race stereotypes differentially function 
in the public sphere? 
A variety of possible explanations exist for the media’s failure to 
engage in the sort of jury blaming in the Zimmerman case that it had 
done in the Simpson case.  Of course, the media could possibly have 
learned from past criticism and decided to accept the jury’s decision 
as properly based on legal standards.330  Another rationale may be that 
race is privileged over gender as a frame for explaining contested 
verdicts.  In other words, in both cases, media and commentators were 
less concerned with the fact that women dominated the respective 
juries; rather, the juries’ racial composition was at issue.  The Simpson 
jury was criticized not because Black women dominated it, but rather 
because the majority of jurors were Black.  In that vein, the Zimmerman 
jury was not criticized, despite being dominated by women, because 
most of the women were White. 
Though the public did not criticize the Zimmerman verdict in 
gendered terms, reports of the deliberations indicate that the jurors’ 
racial and gender identities may indeed have shaped how the jurors 
understood the evidence in the case and gave it meaning.331  Principles 
of intersectionality332 are best able to capture the manner in which race 
and gender interact to impact juror decision-making.  Intersectionality 
maintains that rather than thinking that one characteristic of an 
individual creates a singular, predictable experience of subordination, 
characteristics like race and gender may “interact with each other . . . 
and with a host of other characteristics, like age, income, occupation, 
education, political affiliation, and religion, to make any one 
characteristic an unreliable indicator of bias.”333  Different 
 
 329  Review and Outlook: The Zimmerman Verdict, WALL ST. J. (July 15, 2013), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324348504578605731733310240. 
 330  Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Why the George Zimmerman Trial’s All-Female Jury is 
News, THE ATLANTIC (June 21, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/ 
archive/2013/06/why-the-george-zimmerman-trials-all-female-jury-is-news/277103/. 
 331  Jaren Nichole Wieland, A Jury of One’s Peers: What It Is; How It Is Changing; and 
Why It Is Important, 57 ADVOCATE 24, 28 (2014); Cara Buckley, 6 Female Jurors Are Selected 
for Zimmerman Trial, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2013/06/21/us/6-female-jurors-are-selected-for-zimmerman-trial.html. 
 332  See, e.g., Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, 
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1241 (1991). 
 333  Jean Montoya, “What’s So Magic(al) About Black Women?” Peremptory Challenges at 
the Intersection of Race and Gender, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 369, 380 (1996).  
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characteristics may lead to either privilege or subordination. 
An intersectional approach would interrogate the jurors’ 
experiences not just as women, but also their experiences as either 
White or non-White women, and how that then shapes their 
perceptions of the case.  Take for instance the gendered experience of 
mothering.  In this context, if gender alone was the only component 
in the jury’s assessment of the Zimmerman case facts, mothering would 
have perhaps predicted a different interpretation.  All but one of the 
jurors were mothers.334  Trayvon Martin, a slight, baby-faced, teenager, 
was killed after engaging in typical teenaged behavior—going to a 
convenience store to purchase snacks.  Looking solely to the issue of 
gender, one might have expected that the mothers on the jury might 
have seen Martin as a child, and therefore might have been relatively 
unsympathetic to his killer.  This was not the case, however. 
No window into the jury room existed to allow for a direct 
observation of the deliberations.  Nevertheless, we do have 
commentary offered by jurors soon after the case ended.  That 
commentary indicates that both race and gender informed the jury’s 
reading of the case.  Take for instance the remarks of Juror B37 who 
self-identified as a White woman in her sixties and as a mother of two 
grown children.  The first juror to speak to the press, Juror B37, noted 
that at the beginning of jury deliberations, three of the jurors favored 
acquittal, two favored a manslaughter conviction, and one favored a 
second degree murder conviction.335  Juror B37 believed that 
Zimmerman’s “heart was in the right place” and thought that Martin 
likely became violent first.336  This juror also used to have a gun permit 
and supported Zimmerman’s right to have a gun with him the night of 
the shooting.337 
Intersectionality reminds us that individuals have multiple 
components to their identity, which may interact to affect their 
decision-making.  In this case, it appears that the jurors with children 
approached their decision making as mothers, and that mother 
identity was racially charged as well.  Thus, four out of the five mothers 
viewed the case through the lens of White mothers, not mothers of 
color.  Martin’s race, therefore, created social distance and may have 
 
 334  The 6 Women Who Will Determine Zimmerman’s Fate, HLN (June 24, 2013), 
http://www.hlntv.com/slideshow/2013/06/20/george-zimmerman-murder-trial-
juror-bios. 
 335  Mark Mooney, George Zimmerman Juror Says His ‘Heart Was in the Right Place,’ ABC 
NEWS (July 15, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2013/07/george-
zimmerman-juror-says-his-heart-was-in-the-right-place/. 
 336  Id.  
 337  Id. 
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inhibited jurors from analogizing his experience to their own children.  
To the White female jurors, Martin was perhaps less likely to be seen 
as childlike and more likely to be viewed as a menacing threat, a 
symbolic assailant.338  In her interview with CNN’s Anderson Cooper, 
Juror B37 transformed Martin from victim into the threatening 
assailant, justifying her “belief” in Zimmerman’s account by inventing 
Martin’s motives and actions as a violent aggressor: 
Cooper: So you think, based on the testimony you heard, you 
believe that Trayvon Martin was the aggressor? 
Juror B37: I think the roles changed.  I think, I think George 
got in a little bit too deep, which he shouldn’t have been 
there.  But Trayvon decided he wasn’t going to let him scare 
him and get the one-over, up on him, or something.  And I 
think Trayvon got mad and attacked him.339 
Her assessment that the unarmed Martin, a teenager returning from a 
snack run, was an angry aggressor suggests that she did not primarily 
construct Martin through the lens of a mother.  Rather, racial distance 
between Juror B37 and Martin likely shaped her justification of his 
homicide, “because George had a right to protect himself.”340 
Intersectionality theory posits that race matters in a gendered way, 
as illustrated by another juror’s, Juror B29’s, very different rendering 
of the case facts and decision-making process.  At the time of the trial, 
Juror B29 was a thirty-six-year-old mother of eight children.  Juror B29 
was a Latina and the only juror of color.341  She told the media that she 
felt that Zimmerman “got away with murder.”342  Juror B29 said that “in 
our hearts we felt he was guilty,” but that the law and evidence did not 
allow a guilty verdict.343 
Her comments also highlight how she assessed this case as a 
mother.  Because of her status as a non-White mother, Juror B29 
seemed to be able to see similarities between Martin and her own 
children and similarities between herself and Martin’s mother.  Juror 
B29 stated: 
 
 338  See id.  See also Skolnick who devised the concept of the “symbolic assailant” in 
the context of policing.  JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW 
ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 45 (1967).  
 339  Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees: Exclusive Interview With Juror B-37; Defense Team Reacts 
to Juror Interview (CNN television broadcast July 15, 2013) (transcript available at 
http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1307/15/acd.01.html). 
 340  Id.  
 341  Alyssa Newcomb, George Zimmerman Juror Says ‘In Our Hearts, We Felt He Was 
Guilty,’ ABC NEWS (July 25, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/US/george-zimmerman-
juror-murder/story?id=19770659. 
 342  Id. 
 343  Id. 
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It’s hard for me to sleep, it’s hard for me to eat because I feel 
I was forcefully included in Trayvon Martin’s death.  And as 
I carry him on my back, I’m hurting as much [as] Trayvon’s 
Martin’s mother because there’s no way that any mother 
should feel that pain.344 
Though it is impossible to know how much the juror’s perspective 
might have affected the decision in the case had other jurors shared 
this view,345 Juror B29 compellingly contrasts Juror B37.  Where Juror 
B37 approached the killing of the unarmed Martin as justified because 
of her belief that Martin likely became violent first, Juror B29 thought 
that if not legally guilty, Zimmerman was morally culpable and would 
have to reconcile that with God.346  Though Juror B29 believes 
ultimately that the law is to blame for the jury’s acquittal of 
Zimmerman, she also expressed an empathic sense of responsibility, 
noting her difficulty eating and sleeping after her role as a juror in the 
case that did not find Zimmerman guilty. 
Though the media did not criticize the jury’s verdict in the 
Zimmerman case in the same way it did the verdict in the Simpson 
case, the Zimmerman verdict was not universally accepted.347  After the 
verdict, protests erupted around the country.  Many protesters viewed 
the decision in the case as less legitimate, at least in part, because of 
the absence of Black jurors.  Thus, these protests were an assault on 
the legitimacy of the jury as an institution, a value recognized by the 
courts and validated by social science research.348  “Perceptions of 
fairness and legitimacy based on the racial composition of the jury can 
 
 344  Id.  
 345  Juror B29 initially voted for second degree murder and advocated for that 
position throughout the deliberations.  See Greg Allen, Zimmerman Juror Says He “Got 
Away With Murder,” NPR (July 26, 2013), http://www.npr.org/templates/ 
story/story.php?storyId=205695296.  As juror B29 told an ABC newscaster: “I was the 
juror that was going to give them the hung jury.  Oh, I was.  I fought to the end.”  
Nonetheless, this juror ultimately conformed to the others’ position and acquitted 
Zimmerman on all charges.  Id. 
 346  Id.  
 347  See, e.g., Geraldine L. Palmer, Dissecting the Killing of Trayvon Martin: The Power 
Factor, 5 J. FOR SOC. ACTION IN COUNSELING & PSYCH. 126 (2013); Anthony Hall, 
Comment, A Stand for Justice—Examining Why Stand Your Ground Laws Negatively Impact 
African Americans, 7 SO. REGION BLACK L. STUDENTS ASS’N L. J. 95 (2013); Lizette 
Alvarez, A Florida Law Gets Scrutiny After a Teenager’s Killing; N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20 2012, 
at A1. 
 348  Leslie Ellis, & Shari Siedman Diamond, Race, Diversity, and Jury Composition: 
Battering and Bolstering Legitimacy, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1033, 1050 (2003).  Ellis and 
Diamond found that potential jurors viewed a criminal trial outcome involving a Black 
defendant as fair, whether found guilty or not guilty, when the verdict was rendered 
by a racially diverse jury, whereas the trial was deemed less fair when the defendant 
was convicted by an all-White jury.  
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have a measurable effect on public perceptions of the fairness of the 
criminal justice system.”349 
CONCLUSION 
Concerns about the role that race and gender play in decision-
making are increasingly a part of the dialogue in controversial cases.  
In the two years following the Zimmerman trial, the decisions of grand 
jurors charged with deciding whether charges should be filed against 
officers in the police killings of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri 
and Eric Garner in Staten Island, New York were announced.  In both 
cases, the respective grand juries declined to indict the officers.  Both 
cases highlight the challenge to the legitimacy of our criminal justice 
system when White authorities kill Black civilians and are not held 
criminally responsible.  The law keeps the identity of grand jurors a 
secret, but the racial breakdown of the jurors charged with hearing the 
case against Officer Darren Wilson—three Black members and nine 
White members—was quickly revealed.350  While this body did look like 
the countywide pool from which it was drawn, it did not look like 
Ferguson, the site of inquiry, where 67.4% of the 21,000 residents are 
Black and only 29.3% are White.351  Staten Island, where the grand jury 
declined to indict the police officer who used the chokehold that led 
to the death of Eric Garner, did not release the racial and gender 
composition of the grand jury.352  These cases did not even survive the 
first, lower threshold of probable cause to be able to move forward to 
a public adjudication process; even if they had, the past suggests that 
prospects for holding the defendants criminally responsible would be 
poor.353 
These kinds of cases represent the flip-side of the problem 
identified in Batson v. Kentucky: Black defendants have a right to diverse 
 
 349  Id.  
 350  Greg Botelho & Ed Lavandera, 3 African-Americans on 12-Person Grand Jury 
Weighing Ferguson Shooting Case, CNN (August 26, 2014), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/22/us/missouri-teen-shooting//.   
 351  2010 Census Interactive Population Search (Ferguson, MO), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
(last visited Sept. 26, 2015), http://www.census.gov/2010census/popmap/ 
ipmtext.php?fl=29:2923986.  
 352  A Garner family lawyer estimated the jury to be approximately half White, one 
quarter Black, and one quarter Hispanic.  Rick Hampson, Chokehold cases focuses 
attention of New York’s “forgotten borough,” USA TODAY (Dec. 8, 2014), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/12/06/chokehold-garner-
staten-island-wu-tang-clan/19942489/.  
 353  Steve Visser, Police Using Deadly Force Are Rarely Convicted, ATLANTA J-CONST., 
(Aug. 25, 2014), http://www.ajc.com/news/news/crime-law/police-using-deadly-
force-are-rarely-convicted/ng8Nf//.  
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juries that do not exclude members on the basis of race.354  In Batson, 
the remedy is directed at prosecutors who use their peremptory 
challenges to exclude venire members on the basis of their race.  
Specifically, under Batson, the defendant must first make a prima facie 
case that the prosecutor is striking jurors on the basis of racial 
identity.355  Second, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to “come 
forward with a neutral explanation for challenging Black jurors.”356  
Finally, “the trial court then will have the duty to determine if the 
defendant has established purposeful discrimination.”357 
Cases like Zimmerman’s pit the values and mandates of the fair 
cross-section doctrine for the broader community directly against the 
individual defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.  In Georgia v. 
McCollum, the Court affirmed the broader community value of diverse 
juries by ruling that the Constitution prohibits race-based exclusions, 
even if exercised by the defendant in furtherance of his rights.358  The 
Court specifically authorized prosecutors to make Batson challenges 
when they perceive the defense is striking jurors because of their race 
or gender.359 
On both sides of this problem, the remedy has been woefully 
inadequate and highlights the large gap between the principles of 
Batson and the social psychological realities in which Batson challenges 
operate.360  If we maintain an expanded view of the fair cross-section 
requirement—that it is necessary for the broader community and for 
democratic ideals—we might reconstitute the mechanisms for 
achieving appropriately diverse juries from the individual challenge to 
policy mandates.  The language from Strauder and other cases suggests 
a constitutional avenue exists to broaden how we conceive of the value 
of a fair cross-section in the context of juries by a more expansive 
consideration of how this democratic institution functions to reinforce 
legal legitimacy.361  Communities have a clear stake in having a fair 
 
 354  Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 (1986). 
 355  Id. at 96–97.  
 356  Id. at 97.  
 357  Id. at 98. 
 358  Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 57 (1992).  See Eva S. Nilsen, The Criminal 
Defense Lawyer’s Reliance on Bias and Prejudice, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 1 (1994) for a 
full discussion of this ethical bind for defense attorneys and law students in clinical 
settings.  
 359  McCollum, 505 U.S. at 56. 
 360  Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Looking Across the Empathic Divide: Racialized 
Decision-Making on the Capital Jury, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 573, 587 (2011). 
 361  Batson, 476 U.S. at 84–85, abrogated on different grounds by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 
U.S. 522 (1975); Taylor, 419 U.S. at 53031; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 
308 (1879). 
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cross-section of the community participate in jury decisions to help 
ensure that the broader community accepts those decisions as 
legitimate. 
How might this be operationalized?  First, in recognition of the 
distinct obligations of prosecutors in criminal cases to serve the 
interests of justice and represent the communities in which they work, 
prosecutors might be required to affirmatively seat a jury that 
adequately represents the community from which it is drawn.  Thus, 
rather than treating jury selection as a purely adversarial process, 
whereby each side must mount challenges if a suspicious pattern of 
exclusion arises, the prosecutor may be called upon to demonstrate 
how each decision furthers the fair cross-section imperative.  This 
might be included in Rule 3.8 of the American Bar Association’s Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct, which outlines the “Special 
Responsibilities of a Prosecutor,”362 and serves as a model for 
professional responsibility adopted by most states.  It might also be 
incorporated in the ABA standards for the prosecutorial function in 
jury selection, under Standard 3-5.3.363 
Second, taking the lessons from the social science scholarship on 
the causes and consequences of non-diverse juries, a reconsideration 
of the policy value, if not the constitutionality, of the six-person jury is 
critical.364  Evidence strongly suggests that six-person juries are 
significantly more likely to result in homogeneous composition than 
twelve-person juries.365  Anwar et al.’s analysis of criminal trials in 
Florida provides dramatic evidence of the cost to fairness for 
defendants of color under a six-person jury system.  As Diamond, 
Peery, Dolan and Dolan conclude: “If increasing diversity in order to 
better represent the population is a goal worth pursuing for the U.S. 
jury, the straightforward solution—the key—is a return to the 12-
member jury.”366 
Third, as a matter of policy, jurisdictions should implement 
“affirmative jury selection” practices whereby minority communities 
are oversampled in the issuance of jury summons and then re-
configure the selection process to focus on the creation of a diverse 
 
 362  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2015). 
 363  Criminal Justice Section Standards for the Prosecution Function, ABA, 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal_justice_section_archive/crimjus
t_standards_pfunc_blk.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2015).  
 364  See Anwar, Bayer & Hjalmarsson, supra note 214; Diamond, Peery, Dolan & 
Dolan, supra note 279.  
 365  Diamond, Peery, Dolan & Dolan, supra note 279. 
 366  Id.  
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and inclusive seated jury.367  Thus, this would be coupled at the 
selection stage with the ethical mandate to prosecutors to serve the 
community by furthering the representative cross-section ideals. 
If the approach to jury selection followed these principles, what 
would the Zimmerman jury have looked like?  The Zimmerman jury 
was comprised of five White women and one Hispanic woman.368  
Though the overall pool may have reflected the diversity of the 
community, the six-person jury seated in the case did not.  Zimmerman 
lived in the Retreat at Twin Lakes,369  which was not an all-White 
community.  In fact, the Retreat at Twin Lakes was fairly diverse.  The 
zip code in which the neighborhood was located contained a mix of 
residents: 20% Black, 20% Hispanic, 50% White.370  The overall 
community from which the jury pool was drawn was a diverse one as 
well.371  Sanford is in Seminole County, which is composed of 52% 
women, 64% White, 19% Hispanic, 12% Black.372  Given the county 
demographics, a twelve-person jury should have included six men, at 
least one Black member, two Hispanic members, and no more than 
eight White members.  Had it more accurately reflected a fair cross-
section of the community, the outcome may well have been different. 
 
 
 367  Sommers & Norton, Race and Jury Selection, supra note 215, at 536.  See also Lynch 
& Haney, supra note 360, at 599–604. 
 368  Buckley, supra note 40. 
 369  Chris Francescani, George Zimmerman: Prelude to a Shooting, REUTERS (Apr. 25, 
2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/25/us-usa-florida-shooting 
-zimmerman-idUSBRE83O18H20120425.  
 370  Reporting Trayvon, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Apr. 2, 2012), 
http://www.cjr.org/behind_the_news/reporting_trayvon.php?page=all.  
 371  State & County QuickFacts: Seminole County, Florida, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/12/12117.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2015). 
 372  Id.  
